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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. J. HUBER and 
RALPH DUNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
VICTOR NEWMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 69166. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah. 
HON. BRYAN P. LEVERICH, Judge. 
S.TATEMENT 
This is an action by plaintiffs above named against 
defendant Newman to dissolve an alleged general partner-
ship in the contracting business claimed to have been begun 
in the forepart of April, 1942, embracing a general line 
of business in the intermountain area and still subsisting; 
for an accounting of pending business, and for a judgment 
for any balance to be found due them on such accounting. 
As interim relief they asked for the appointment of a 
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2 
receiver to take over, make collections, pay debts, wind 
up and distribute. See Complaint Rec., pp. 1-3.) From an 
assirted judgment for plaintiffs for $19,451.03 the defend-
ant appeals. 
At the outset, before the issuance or service of a sum-
mons, the plaintiffs caused to be issued and served a show 
cause order (rec. 5) and citation (10) requiring defend-
ant to appear and show why a receiver should not be ap-
pointed. The order contained an injunction against Newman 
paying out any of his funds or disposing of his property 
or assets. The injunction order was, however, vacated be-
cause improvidently issued without notice, hearing or bond 
(9). And at the hearing receivership was denied (18), the 
alleged partnership having been denied under oath (17) 
and the plaintiff failing to make a case therefor by his 
oral testimony. It was further shown that the only current 
business of Mr. Newman was under large construction con-
tracts made by him with the Government, its prime con-
tractors, or the Western Pacific Railroad Company for 
construction work urgently needed in connection with the 
war defense effort. These contracts were awarded to New-
man alone (not with Huber or Dunkley) upon a careful 
scrutiny of his ability to perform, secured by heavy in-
demnity bonds furnished by himself, and were not trans-
ferrable. A court receiver without financial backing or 
experience in construction work could not get himself 
substituted in Newman's place in these contracts, nor 
compel the Government or others to recognize or do busi-
ness with him. The contracts contained clauses authorizing 
cancellation and reletting in the event of any delays or 
complications threatening interference or punctual com-
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3 
pletion of the jobs. Any attempted interference by a court 
receiver would simply have destroyed instead of preserving 
the res for final adjudication by the court. 
The hearing on the receivership application was on 
October 28, 1942 (rec. 10, 12) and was denied Novem-
ber 5, 1942 (minute order p. 18). Some days later another 
and more lengthy order was prepared by plaintiffs' counsel 
(why so, rather than by counsel of the prevailing party?), 
which was signed by the Judge and served on defendant's 
counsel (rec. pp. 21-22). In this order, not only was the 
denial of a receiver repeated, but there was also inserted 
a clause (may we presume inadvertently?) awarding to 
plaintiff certain affirmative relief not prayed for in the 
show cause order or citation and on which defendant had 
not been heard or cited into court. That is to say, the de-
fendant Newman was ordered and required to immediately 
keep separate accounts of the work done on the pending 
hospital job, railroad job, and Harrison-Dorman job men-
tioned in the complaint; that he keep his funds pertaining 
to those jobs separate and apart from his other funds; that 
he do not commingle, dissipate or disburse the same except 
for necessary expenses on those jobs, pending final de-
termination of the case; and that separate accounts be 
ready for inspection by plaintiffs within ten days after 
service of the order upon him (21, 22 and 23, 24). 
These affirmative provisions of the order denying a 
receiver were void because without or in excess of juris-
diction. First, because it was not within the scope or purview 
of the show cause order and citation by which defendant 
was brought before the court. Second, it purported to grant 
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4 
affirmative mandatory relief by way of accounting at that 
preliminary and interlocutory stage of the case, by way of 
an order to account, which could only be lawfully granted 
after issues joined, trial, findings and decree to account 
in plaintiffs' favor. By his affidavit on the hearing of 
the show cause order the defendant categorically denied 
that any partnership existed between him and the plain-
tiffs, and the burden was upon them to established that 
contested fact at a trial on the merits. And third, the de-
fendant was not served with a summons requiring him to 
answer the complaint until November 4, 1942 (pp. 19-20) 
which was a week after the hearing on the receivership ap-
plication, and but one day before the court's minute order 
denying the same. 
The said supplementary order was further void because 
it was in the nature of a writ of mandamus, or a manda-
tory injunction, commanding the defendant to do some-
thing which could not in any event be granted or awarded 
without notice, hearing, and an injunction bond to in-
demnify defendant against loss or damage if it finally be 
determined that the order or relief was wrongfully granted, 
contrary to the governing statute. Injunctive relief is 
nearly always confined to preventative relief, i. e. to stay 
threatened action. Affirmative or mandatory relief is very 
rare indeed, and only in clear cases and with abundant 
caution. It is never granted to anticipate relief which can 
only be given by the final decree. 
Defendant's counsel at once moved to vacate and set 
aside this order (p. 26), but presently decided that the 
order, being innocuous and void on its face, could not 
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5 
acquire force and effect by delay to bring the motion to 
vacate it to a hearing. In the apt words of Judge Straup 
in Oldroyd v. McCrea,, Judge, "its nullity would keep and 
would not be mellowed by age." Meantime it could be 
resisted and thrown aside whenever any attempt should 
be made to enforce it. We mention the matter at this time 
because plaintiffs' counsel spent a good deal of time at the 
trial in trying to convince defendant on the witness stand 
that he was guilty of contemptuous conduct in not obeying 
the order, and in trying to frighten him by swinging the 
order like a club over his head. And the trial judge (other 
than the one who made the order) appeared to fall in with 
the notion to a substantial extent. 
Thereafter the plaintiffs elected to file an amended 
complaint (13-16), which was in large part a reiteration 
of the original complaint. And the defendant filed an 
original, and later an amended, answer and counterclaim 
(pp. 51-59). The latter denied the allegations of partner-
ship relation or status, but admitted certain transactions 
with plaintiffs pertaining to the three jobs mentioned. And 
in his third defense and counter-claim defendant alleged that 
he himself was the sole owner and contractor on the three 
jobs in question; and that the plaintiffs were employed by 
him for a compensation or reward to perform supervisory 
and accounting service for defendant on the jobs in question 
during the latter's necessitated absence in charge of his 
operations on other construction work on larger and more 
important jobs or contracts. And that these were the mat-
ters sought to be complained of in the complaint. 
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6 
In the counter-claims it was further alleged that the 
plaintiffs while so employed in the defendant's service, had 
received about $13,000 of defendant's money, for which they 
had never accounted to defendant; but which they had dis-
bursed largely for their own use and benefit, and in other 
and unexplained disbursements ; that they had failed to 
keep proper books of account; that they had failed to keep 
their transactions and accounts upon the three jobs in 
question separate and apart from each other, but had so 
commingled the same as to render impossible the separa-
tion of items and disbursements belonging to each of the 
three jobs from the others, for which defendant in turn 
would be accountable to separate and independent im-
ployers; and so that it was likewise impossible to determine 
the true state of accounts as between the defendant and 
the plaintiffs as his employees, servants or agents. That 
the plaintiffs had received and appropriated to their own 
uses, and failed to account to the defendant, fN{ more than 
sufficient of defendant's funds entrusted to them, to pay 
and satisfy all just claims they might have had against 
the defendant. That they had also mismanaged and botched 
up the jobs under their supervision, and betrayed his con-
fidence and trust. That they were debarred, in equity, from 
calling upon defendant for an accounting until they should 
first account to him as aforesaid, so that the results thereof 
might be taken into consideration in any final settlement 
between defendant and the plaintiffs. He prayed that the 
court require plaintiffs to give an account of their steward-
ship of his funds, property and affairs committed to their 
trust. For copy of these pleadings see Appendix post 
p. 116. 
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Thus it appears by the pleadings that both the plain-
tiffs and the defendant are suing each other for an equitable 
accounting, the grounds of equity jurisdiction being, on 
the one hand, the existence of a general partnership between 
the parties and conduct by one partner detrimental to the 
other two ; and on the other hand a denial of the partner-
ship and an allegation instead of an employment relation 
involving trust and confidence, the receipt of large sums 
of the employer's money by his employees; their misap-
propriation of large sums thereof; their failure and neglect 
to keep adequate accounts to show what they did with the 
money; and to keep separate accounts upon the different 
jobs on which they were employed and upon which defend-
ant had contracted with separate institutions or concerns 
and must account to each separately. And on the ground of 
multiplicity and complexity of the items of account involved. 
It follows that it was the first duty of the trial court 
to determine from evidence which of these conflicting 
theories is correct. If plaintiffs' theory of a general part-
nership with defendant embracing not only the three un-
settled jobs in question but numerous others was correct, 
and that the defendant was guilty of conduct prejudicing 
the rights and interests of the plaintiffs, it should make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law accordingly, and 
enter a preliminary judgment that defendant account to 
the plaintiffs. That is, that defendant should file in court 
and serve on the plaintiffs a written statement of account, 
containing both receipts and disbursements, with leave 
to plaintiffs to surcharge and falsify the same in any one 
or more items and particulars. But if the court should find 
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upon the evidence that there was no partnership relation, 
or none involving the three jobs complained about, or any 
of them, then it should enter a decree that plaintiffs take 
nothing, that defendant is not liable to account, and dismiss 
the complaint. 
On the other hand, should the evidence justify a find-
ing that the plaintiffs were employees of the defendant, 
entrusted with his money, confidence, and management or 
supervision of one or more of his construction jobs that 
defendant had under independent contracts of his own with 
the Government, the railroad or other large institutions; 
that they owed him duties of loyalty and obedience to lawful 
instructions ; also a degree of care, skill and ability com-
mensurate with the tasks undertaken by them for him; the 
duty of strict and accurate accounting of money, property 
and affairs of defendant as their employer; the keeping 
of just, correct and adequate books of account upon each 
separate job on which they were employed, especially of 
the disbursements, distinct from the outlays upon other 
jobs; and the duty to show and prove every disbursement 
claimed to have been made by them from the trust funds 
in their hands. Upon such a showing by the evidence, it 
would be the court's duty not only to deny the accounting 
asked by the plaintiffs and dismiss their complaint, but to 
make findings and decree pursuant to the counter-claims 
that the plaintiffs account to the defendant by serving and 
filing an itemized statement of their receipts and disburse-
ments upon each job separately, and to make a full account-
ing to defendant ·of all trust funds in their hands. Such 
a statement the defendant might contradict, surcharge and 
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falsify by objections and exceptions, to be supported by evi-
dence. Should the plaintiffs have been unable to do this 
by reason of their own recreancy in keeping the accounts, 
or by reason of their misappropriation and misuse of the 
funds, it would have been just too bad for them, and for 
their chances of getting out of the affair without a heavy 
judgment against themselves in defendant's favor, instead 
of recovering anything from him. Citations later. 
Suppose a further possible case, for which there is 
warrant in the evidence. Should the court upon a survey 
of all the evidence, find and conclude that the plaintiffs 
were trusted employees of the defendant; that they had 
mismanaged and misappropriated his funds, and botched 
the jobs to his great financial loss, and failed to keep ade-
quate accounts so that his business in their hands was 
thrown into dire confusion, preventing any possible item-
ized accounting. But that the agreed compensation to which 
they would have been entitled for a proper and meritorious 
performance of the duties of their employment was to have 
been a share of the net profits after all bills were paid. In 
such a situation they would certainly not have been entitled 
to an accounting from defendant of the net profits until 
they had first rendered to him a just and correct accounting, 
not only of all moneys entrusted to them and the outlays 
upon each job separately, but all losses suffered by de-
fendant in consequence of their wilful or negligent acts 
or misconduct in the handling of the work trusted to their 
supervision, for which they were equally accountable as 
for the trust moneys. If they should fail or be unable to so 
account in full, and to prove the correctness and legality of 
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every disbursement of the trust moneys, they would thereby 
debar and prevent themselves from seeking an accounting 
from defendant of the net profits; since their own correct 
accounting would enter into and become part of a correct 
accounting by defendant in fixing the net profits. In such 
case their prayer for equitable relief would kick back in 
their own faces and they would become subject to both civil 
and criminal remedies. Citations later. 
In stating these principles of the law of equitable ac-
counting we are not immediately concerned with the me-
chanics of such an accounting, if and when decreed in favor 
of one party or the other. That is, we are not now con-
cerned with whether the court itself may take the accounts, 
or whether it should be referred to a referee. In a proper 
case the court may do either, in its discretion. But we 
are saying that before the court could lawfully proceed 
to an accounting in one way or the other, it must first, 
upon evidence within the issues, make appropriate findings 
of fact constituting the ground-work upon which it, by 
its decree, shall fix the liability of one party or the other 
to proceed to make such an accounting. This is a juris-
dictional prerequisite to any accounting at all, as this court 
has decided, and until complied with there is no power, 
authority or jurisdiction of the court to meddle with the 
matter, or to proceed to an accounting at its own instance 
regardless of the unsettled issues in the pleadings. The 
trial court erred in this vital matter as we shall see. 
This neglect of the court was not due to any lack of 
understanding or due appreciation of the proper order of 
procedure. This was made clear not only by the opening 
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statements of counsel, but from the subsequent discussions 
in the progress of the trial. Thus, during the cross-
examination of plaintiff Dunkley on the witness stand, 
when he had testitfied regarding the Harrison-Dorman 
job (one of those involved in the action), that he stayed 
on that job about three weeks, then left it and did not go 
back; that he had heard how much money had been paid 
or received on the job, but he had never made any settle-
ment with Mr. Newman. Then Dunkley's attorney flew to 
his rescue with an offer to account immediately if Newman 
would do likewise (oblivious to the considerations we have 
mentioned, and without tendering any written or itemized 
statement of account by Dunkley or Huber-hence a mere 
stall or smoke screen). To which Newman attorney replied: 
"We will settle on the basis of our profit out 
there right now, because we lost $6000.00." 
MR. MATTHEWS: It is a different theory 
entirely. We are asking for an accounting on the 
basis of the relation of trust and confidence in our 
employees. They are asking for an accounting on 
the basis of a partnership before partnership has 
been proven, which cannot be done. 
THE COURT: Then you refuse the offer? 
MR. MORRISSEY: The offer that he made, 
yes; unless the court thinks there is a partnership. 
THE COURT: I am not ready to hold that yet. 
* * * You are asking for an accounting in your 
counter-claim, but upon a different theory. 
MR. MORRISSEY: That is it, as I understand 
the pleadings. 
THE COURT: I take it that if both of you ask 
for an accounting, then probably there should be 
an accounting. The only question is what theory the 
accounting should be on. 
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MR. MORRISSEY: I think so. 
THE COURT: All right, let us go into that. Let 
us go into the question of whether this is a partner-
ship. Leave the rest of it out until we get through 
with that. (Rec. pp. 186, 187, 188.) 
And a little while later, after a discussion of the same 
proposition, the court stated: 
'THE COURT: If there is a partnership I will 
order the account to cover all of this matter set up 
here. But if the ·court determines it is not a part-
nership I will dismiss the complaint, no cause of 
action. I will do the same on the counterclaim. 
MR. MORRISSEY: I think so, yes. (Rec. pp. 
201-202.) 
And again later, the defendant Newman was asked 
on cross-examination: 
Q. You haven't paid Mr. Dunkley or Mr. Huber 
any moneys on the Harrison-Dorman job, have you? 
A. The Harrison-Dorman job definitely lost 
$7,000. 
Q. You haven't given them an accounting on 
that? 
MR. MATTHEWS: I object to that. There is 
no order of this court for an accounting, and until 
it is decided that there is. a partnership and an order 
made, none can be had. ( Rec. pp. 227, 228.) 
Again, at another point, when Mr. Dunkley was asked 
on the stand about certain checks drawn by him and Huber 
on the Huber & Dunkley bank account in which it was else-
where testified that about $13,000 of Victor Newman's 
money had been deposited. He was asked: 
Q. Here is one (check) for $3,000, or $5,000? 
Tell us what became of that, if you know? 
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MR. CALLISTER: Just a moment; it looks to 
me like we are getting into the accounting phase of it. 
THE COURT: Yes, I think we are getting into 
that. Let us see if there should be an accounting 
first. 
MR. MORRISSEY: All right. (Rec. p. 186.) 
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of two days' trial of 
this case, the trial court, without having determined any 
of the issues in the pleading as to which of the parties 
owed a duty to account to the other, without deciding 
whether the plaintiffs were partners of defendant or em-
ployees of the defendant; without deciding which of the 
parties had breached their duties as a partner or as an 
employee, proceeded to the appointment of a referee with 
instructions to take an account. (Rec. pp. 77, 78-79 and 
Bill of Excep. pp. 303-308.) 
When we say the trial court failed to decide these 
issues, we of course mean that the court made no written 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or decree ordering 
either plaintiffs or the defendant to account to the other, 
establishing their status or relationship to each other, the 
breach of duty flowing therefrom, or settling the issues in 
the pleadings in this respect. Until this has been done the 
trial court acquires no jurisdiction to order an accounting. 
Apparently the trial court intended to have findings pre-
pared and a decree to account. For, after indicating his 
oral conclusion at the end of the second day's trial that it 
seemed to him "that these were joint ventures up to Sep-
temper 3, 1942 (Rec. pp. 303, 305) ; and that a referee 
should be appointed (Rec. p. 306), he went on to say to 
plaintiffs' counsel : "I will want you to prepare findings 
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in the nature of an interlocutory decree" (Rec. 308), mean-
ing doubtless that both findings and a decree should be 
prepared. But it was never done. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION 
TO PROCEED TO AN ACCOUNTING OF THE AFFAIRS 
OF AN ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP UNTIL IT HAS 
FIRST JUDICIALLY DETERMINED T'HE EXISTENCE 
OF SUCH PARNERSHIP UPON ADEQUATE EVIDENCE 
WITHIN THE ISSUES, AND UNTIL AFTER IT HAS 
ENTERED AN APPEALABLE DECREE THAT DE-
FENDANT ACCOUNT. 
Rozelle v. District Court, 85· Utah 582; 39 Pac. 
2d 1113; 
1 Corp. Jur. Segundum, 680, Accounting, sec. 40; 
1 Corp. Jur., Accounting, p. 642, sec. 129, n. 8-9, 
12-15; 
1 Corp. J ur., Accounting, p. 643, sec. 130, n. 31; 
47 Corp. Jur., Partnership, p. 1241, sec. 955, n. 
90-93. 
The facts pleaded and relief asked in the Rozelle case 
were a close parallel to the complaint in the instant case. 
The district court on the trial of the Rozelle case made 
written findings of fact responsive to the issues, to the 
effect that a partnership existed, with conclusions of law 
and a decree to account following. To that extent the trial 
court followed correct procedure. But there was no evi-
dence at the trial that a three-way partnership existed, as 
alleged in the complaint. Hence the judgment to account 
could not be upheld. On appeal to the Supreme Court 
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(coupled with the writ of certiorari issued by this court 
to bring up the record and stay the hand of the district 
court from proceeding with the accounting) this court 
held: 
1. That the district court had no jurisdiction 
to order an accounting of a partnership that did not 
exist; 
2. That the judgment of the District Court 
finding and decreeing a partnership, without evi-
dence thereof, though void was an appealable judg-
ment, and voidable on certiorari ; 
3. That the void judgment could be reviewed 
and vacated on appeal and certiorari without await-
ing the result of the accounting ordered by the trial 
court. That is, the defendant could protect himself 
from the accounting illegally ordered by coming 
to the Supreme Court with it. 
That is, where a complaint alleges partnership and 
breach of duty, there is apparent jurisdiction. If the proofs 
fail to show partnership and liability to account, the ap-
parent jurisdiction fails and the court cannot proceed to 
an account. 
But these two necessities compel a third one, as the 
Rozelle case and other citations show, namely, that the trial 
court must make written findings of the facts constituting 
partnership and breach of duty creating liability to account; 
it must draw the appropriate conclusions of law therefrom; 
and it must deceree the party liable to proceed to render 
such account. Neither the allegation nor the proof, nor 
both together, create an enforcible duty or obligation to 
account; but there must be allegation, proofs, findings, con-
clusions and decree to account to effect that result. And 
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the losing party has the right to test the correctness of 
the findings and decree by an appeal to the Supreme Court 
before he can be obliged to account or to open his books 
to the inspection of the opposite party. Otherwise the 
damage would be done before he could prevent it. The 
right of privacy of one's books and papers is a valuable 
right and is surrounded by constitutional safeguards. See 
Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 Pac. 2nd 703. 
And although the injured party may invoke certiorari 
or prohibition in a proper case, he may if he choose, wait 
and correct both jurisdictional and procedural errors by 
appeal from any final judgment entered after an attempted 
accounting. 
The principles of the decision of this court in the Rozelle 
case have been reflected in the decisions of the courts of 
other states, and in the following law texts supported by 
the decisions cited in the notes thereto. 
As defendant is not obliged to account until 
plaintiff's right thereto is determined after dispos-
ing of all matters in bar, the practice is to enter a 
preliminary decree directing the defendant to ac-
ccount. 
1 Corpus Juris, p. 643, Accounting, sec. 130, 
n. 30-31. 
The neglect of the trial court to comply with this juris-
dictional requirement necessitates a reversal of its judgment 
against the defendant, and this appeal might well end here. 
There are however numerous other vital errors, most 
of which we feel called upon to lay before the court in this 
brief. Not that we wish to burden the court with unneces-
sary work. But we are mindful of the fact that the court 
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is at liberty, in its discretion, to suspend its labors when-
ever it is satisfied that the judgment complained of must 
be reversed. Counsel for an appellant, however, feel it to 
be their duty to pretty well cover the field, so that the 
client's interests may in any event receive protection. 
Where an accounting is sought, an interlocutory 
judgment, decree or order establishing the rights of 
the parties, dissolving the partnership where it has 
not already been dissolved, determining the defen-
dant's liability to account, and directing an account-
ing, is usually a prerequisite to the actual taking and 
stating of an account. 
47 Corpus Juris, p. 1241, Partnership, sec. 955, 
notes 90-93 and cases cited. 
And while in some states this decree is treated only 
as interlocutory, in others, including Utah, it is final for 
the purposes of an appeal. 
Rozelle v. District Court, supra. 
1 Corpus Juris, 647, Accounting, sec. 140, note 
89 and cases. 
The correct practice in suits for an accounting is 
first to dispose of all matters, in bar of the account-
ing before entering a decree to account. And even 
when the plea in bar does not cover all the matters 
involved in the pleadings, it should be first passed 
upon. 
1 Corpus Juris, p. 642, Accounting, sec. 129, 
notes 8-9 and cases. 
Of course, in a case where the defendant does not dis-
pute the partnership relation, or his duty to account, but 
only contends that upon a proper accounting the balance 
is in his own favor, there is no preliminary issue to be 
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settled, and he should tender his account with his answer. 
Thus: 
Where the right to an account is admitted in 
terms or in effect, the court may order it at once 
without waiJ<ting to try the issues of fact raised by 
the pleadings. 
Id., p. 642, note 10 and citations. 
We are not concerned with that situation here, because 
the answer and counter-claims flatly denied the partnership 
relation and duty of defendant to account at the outset, 
and the defendant stood on his rights to have that issue 
decided first and before any accounting should be under-
taken. 
Complainant is not entitled to a decree to ac-
count, as of course, and if the answer called for is 
given and there is no admission of the allegations of 
the bill, and no consent to the entry of the decree, 
the decree should not be directed except after a hear-
ing upon which complainant must adduce evidence 
of the existence of the facts alleged as the basis of 
· his right to an accounting; otherwise, the bill will 
be dismissed. 
1 Corpus Juris, pp. 642-3, sec. 129, notes 12-15 
et cit. 
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FAILURE TO MAKE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT 
An appealable decree to account presupposes written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law separately, sup-
porting such decree, as required by code section 104-26-2. 
And these findings must be responsive to each and every 
issue in the pleadings on which the right to an accounting 
depends. No such findings were ever made or filed in this 
case, and no decree to account was ever entered. 
It will not suffice for plaintiffs to refer to the find-
ings and decree entered by the court two months later, on 
June 7, 1942 (Rec. pp. 83-90), based upon the void at-
tempted accounting in the interim, on which a large money 
judgment was entered by the court in attempted consuma-
tion of such void accounting. Those findings are void for 
lack of jurisdiction to enter upon an accounting, and so 
is the decree which follows it. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO 
MAKE AND FILE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT 
RESPONSIVE TO EACH AND EVERY ISSUE IN THE 
PLEADINGS, BOTH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE. 
A FAILURE TO MAKE A FINDING UPON EACH AND 
EVERY MATERIAL ISSUE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
See Utah Rev. Stat. 1933, 104-26-2 and 104-26-3, 
and decisions of Supreme Court thereunder, 
cited in great number in column 2, page 
1300, following said sections. 
It would be superfluous to recite those decisions here, 
in view that the proposition is rudimentary in the mind of 
every justice of this court and of most lawyers. 
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Taking up the amended complaint (Rec. pp. 13-15) 
there is no finding responsive to: 
Paragraphs 1 and 2, alleging a partnership; 
Paragraphs 3 and 4, alleging breaches of duty; 
and the amended answer and counter-claim (Rec. pp. 51-56) 
there is no finding responsive to : 
The negative issues contained in the first de-
fense (Rec. 51); 
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, (Rec. 53, 54) of the third 
defense and counter-claim; 
None as to the alleged breaches, of duty, in 
parag. 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof; 
None as to the averments in parag. 9, 10, 11 
thereof; 
None as to the issues concerning the Fort Doug-
las job alleged in the fourth defense and 
counter-claim (Rec. 56-59) . 
Neither are there any conclusions of law that would 
be responsive to such findings of fact, if made. Especially 
required was a finding of fact responsive to the issue ten-
dered in paragraph 5 of the third defense and counter-claim 
(Rec. p. 54) alleging that the plaintiffs had received in 
trust more than $13,000 of defendant's money for which 
they had failed to account, and appropriated to their own 
use. 
It is alleged in the third defense and counter-claim 
that because of these and other derelictions and failure to 
keep records and render accounts, they had not only con-
fused and jumbled matters between plaintiffs and defen-
dant themselves, but had also mixed up defendants transac-
tions on the different jobs so that defendant could not ac-
count to his own employers and correlates on each job 
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separately. As in other walks of life where a party has 
by his own acts prevented the relief he seeks and bungled 
the accounts of his employer or partner he will be denied 
such relief. 
47 Corp. Jur. 1241, Partnership, sec. 955, n. 5 
and 6; 
Id. 1245, Partnership, notes 71-72, 74-75. 
Hence the necessity for a specific finding of fact on this 
issue. 
THE EVIDENCE 
In view that neither issues nor evidence create a duty 
to account until consummated by appropriate findings and 
decree to account, it may be unnecessary to devote much 
time or space to pointing out the evidence in this volumin-
ous record upon which such findings and decree could and 
should have been rested. It is sufficient if there was some 
evidence, pro or con, on which the issues of fact could have 
been settled by appropriate findings and decree. Further-
more, should we undertake to sift out all the evidence, dis-
tribute the same under each of the issues, and point out 
the appropriate findings for each, it would not only neces-
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sitate enormous labor, but might imply a belief that this 
court is going to take upon itself the burden of preparing 
or adopting findings, de novo, to supply the omission of 
the trial court to do so. We entertain no such belief. 
Nevertheless we may, without trespassing too greatly 
on the necessities of the case, devote a few pages to assembl-
ing some of the evidence upon the first and most outstand-
ing issue in the case, i. e., that as to the existence, or no, 
of the alleged partnership relation between the parties on 
which plaintiffs' case hinges. We do this, not to invite this 
court to make a finding thereon, but to show that there was 
evidence calling for a finding which the trial court omitted 
to make on a jurisdictional matter, before it should proceed 
to an attempted accounting. This issue, of course, envisages 
not only what was said and done by the parties, but the 
logical inferences arising from a comparison of the financial 
strength, standing and ability of the plaintiffs to balance 
against the defendant's capital, assets, and established bus-
iness standing in the construction field. What mutuality 
of contribution could there be between such dispropor-
tionate odds? In the testimony upon these elements of the 
situation, we let each party testify for himself rather than 
submit him to the possibly biased opinion of others. The 
plaintiff Huber did not appear or testify at the trial at all. 
But the plaintiff Dunkley threw some light on the standing 
and assets of both plaintiffs. Concerning himself, Mr. 
Dunkley testified : 
"Prior to this I had done a little trucking, if it 
might be termed that. I don't claim to be a contractor 
comparable to a big contractor. By 'contractor,' if I 
agree to move something at a certain price, in that 
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way I might term myself a contractor. Prior to the 
*Hill Field Job I had operated trucks. about a year, 
and before that I used to haul produce and any other 
thing that might come along. About a year previous 
I had hauled some gravel." (Rec. 138, 139., 
*NOTE: The "Hill Field Job" was the first of several small jobs which the parties undertook together. 
It was further testified by both Dunkley and Newman 
that neither Huber nor Dunkley ever owned more than one 
truck each on any of the jobs in evidence in this case, for 
the use or rental of which they received liberal compensa-
tion in addition to such compensation as they bargained 
for, for their personal time and service. (Rec. pp. 158, 160-
1, 163-6, 169, 171, 179, 191, 195.) 
On the other hand, Newman alone was possessed of 
equipment of the value of more than $100,000 including, 
inter alia, three shovels, three cats, 25 trucks, one road 
patrol, and a variety of other tools and equipment, which 
"keeps getting bigger all the time." (Rec. pp. 202-203, 235.) 
On these facts there was no dispute or conflict in the evi-
dence. 
By "shovels" reference is made to the large caterpillar 
tractors mounting an engine and an immense crane or steel 
arm, turning on a pivot as it swings about, on which by 
wire ropes and pulleys a huge spiked bucket or scoop bites 
into a solid bank of earth and gravel, lifting two or three 
tons at a bite, which it dumps into waiting trucks to be 
hauled away. These shovels are said to cost when new about 
$25,000 each, ·but there is mention in the evidence of a 
smaller second-hand one for $14,000. 
There is evidence also that Newman's services and 
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equipment are in large and steady command by the govern-
ment, and by large prime contractors who wish to sub-
contract for grading and removal of dirt, gravel and rock. 
His recognized ability to get things done, his financial 
standing and equipment, etc., have gotten him a standing 
and a reputation for capacity and dependability. The con-
sequence is that he is overloaded with large construction 
jobs in his line, for which the contract prices run well into 
the five figures. He works his clerks and bookkeepers to 
death trying to keep up. Neither he nor the plaintiffs are 
very well educated. But Newman is a "live wire," a captain 
of industry in the industrial army on which so much now 
depends. He is a General, while the plaintiffs are privates, 
or at most sergeants or corporals. Like Cincinnatus of old, 
or our own General Israel Putnam, who were called from 
their plows to command an army in their country's service; 
like the peasant Garibaldi, he is indispensible in the present 
crisis. He is qualified to both give orders and to see that 
they are executed. His employees like him, like to work 
for him. His coming upon a job galvanizes them into steady 
action and they move; so does the sand and gravel. He gets 
action. 
The plaintiffs, per contra, by this record, never had a 
job of their own which they were able to execute and per-
form on their own resources. And of those on which they 
were employed by Newman, they succeeded in taking two 
small ones in their own names, but they depended on New-
man's aid and assistance, his equipment, his funds to meet 
the pay rolls. (The McKee Job, 121-2, 157-9, 209, 210.) 
(The Supply Depot Job, 164-166·.) One of those two was 
Newman's by arrangement in the first instance, but they 
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being on the ground took it in their own names, and New-
man financed and equipped it. The other jobs were all 
Newman's, gotten in his name, on his responsibility, de-
pending on his equipment, funds, standing and credit, on 
which plaintiffs had employment on liberal terms of com-
pensation, as a friendly gesture. As Newman testified: "I 
always thought I was doing Huber a favor." (Rec. pp. 209-
210; post p. 32.) 
Going now beyond this preliminary comparison of 
the financial standing, assets and capability of these parties, 
we proceed to their actual words and dealings from which 
any partnership or other relationship must be constructed. 
At the outset we find the plaintiffs in dependant's home, 
enjoying his hospitality, willing recipients of the financial 
crumbs falling from his table. While so present as his 
friends and guests, Newman's home telephone rang and 
he was called to speak with Captain Beener of the U. S. 
Army Engineering Corps at Hill Field, near Ogden. Cap-
tain Beener asked Newman to come up in a hurry the next 
day with a dozen trucks to do some grading in a hurry. 
Newman replied that he was too busy with other work 
already undertaken but he said, I have a couple of fellows 
here and I will send them up with some equipment to super-
vise the job. Huber and Dunkely consented to go up and 
supervise it and keep the books and accounts on the job. 
Within fifteen minutes Newman by telephone rounded up 
seven of the ten trucks sent up and Huber and Dunkley 
found the other three or took their own two. (Newman, 
Rec. pp. 203 to 207; Dunkley, Rec. 118-120, 140-3, 152-4.) 
Now we will let each party give his own account of what 
was said between them on the subject of their arrangements 
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with respect to either this first Hill Field job, or with ref-
erence to any series of jobs or operations which they might 
have expected or anticipated working together upon. 
As to the First Hill Field Job, Dunkley testified : 
"The arrangement on the job was that Huber 
and I would go up and do the work without pay, that 
is, without a set salary, and whatever profits there 
was in the job would be split equally between New-
man, Huber and myself. We went ahead and done 
the work on that arrangement. (Rec. p. 119.) 
As to general working agre·ement on a series of jobs, if 
any, Dunkley testified: 
"We had no arrangements as to how long it 
would last. It was just an arrangement from job to 
job. When we took a job and finished it, if we wanted 
another one we would go to another one. No definite 
time on it. If we finished one job and decided when 
it was finished to take another one, we took another 
one if it was mutually agreeable to all concerned. 
(Rec. p. 133.) 
NOTE: This testimony contradicted and thereby destroyed 
and disproved his allegations in the complaint and amended 
complaint that there was a general partnership agree-
ment to comprehend all jobs they might get in the inter-
mountain district from the forepart of April, 1942 that 
were still in existence when this suit was started on Oct. 
13:, 1942, which they prayed the court to dissolve and order 
an accounting and other relief. 
But compare Newman's testimony covering the same 
period of time and also the first Hill Field job : 
As to a general working agree·ment, if any, Newman 
testified: 
"I had a large job at that time out at Kearns, 
Utah, and one at the Airport, and I was fully occu-
pied. I had too much to do, too much equipment td 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
look after. So I told Huber and Dunkley, I says, I 
have got more work than I can handle myself. If you 
fellows want to go out and take some jobs I will 
furnish the equipment, make the payroll, and share 
the profit with you. I said, you can work for me and 
I will split the profit." (Rec. 203-206.) 
As to the First Hill Field Job, Newman testified: 
"They were in my house one night. We used to 
be friends. I got a telephone from Capt. Beener 
at Hill Field saying, 'The Army Engineers say you 
have some equipment to do a rush job and to get hold 
of you. Can you get some trucks up here in the morn-
ing?' He wanted about 12 trucks. He says, 'How 
much?' I says, '$2.65 a yard.' I says, 'I am awfully 
busy but I have a couple of fellows here, I will send 
them up with some trucks and they will come up and 
supervise it.' So I says to Ed Huber, at $2.65 a yard 
we ought to make 50 cts. a yard profit on it; let's get 
some trucks and go up there. He said 'Yes,' and so they 
did. And that is the way it started. That was about 
the first of April, 1942. Mr. Dunkley was supposed to 
have been a timekeeper; Huber was supposed to have 
been the man. I told him to hire all the trucks he 
could. I would be safe to say that out of the ten trucks 
that started up next morning I hired at least seven of 
them in the next fifteen minutes over my telephone. 
(Rec. 203-205.) 
There is not so much difference between the versions 
of the facts given by Dunkley and Newman as there is in 
their conclusions. But whatever the difference was, it was 
the duty of the trial court to have decided it by an appropri-
ate finding of fact. It neglected to do so. Its omission was 
reversible error. ante page 19. 
Very evidently the plaintiffs and their counsel counted 
heavily on the profit sharing feature of whatever the ar-
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rangement was, to clinch their contention that there was 
a partnership, and a general one at that. The trial court 
appeared to share that view also, to judge from certain of 
his remarks in the record, although he never made such a 
finding of fact or decree to account. But that viewpoint is 
unjustified. It is a question of intention of the parties to 
be drawn from all the evidence. If plaintiffs were working 
for defendant and were to get a share of the profits in lieu 
of a stated salary on jobs that belonged to defendant New-
man, they were still employees. 
"A party who, without being interested in prop-
erty is, by agreement, to receive as compensation for 
his services, and only as compensation, a certain pro-
portion of the profits, and is neither held out to the 
world as a partner nor, through the negligence of 
the owner permitted to hold himself out to the world 
as a partner, is not a partner either as to the owner 
or third persons." 
Shepard v. Pratt, 16 Kan. 209; 27 Pac. States 
Rep.209; 
Lefevre v. Castiagnino, 5 Colo. 564; 
Mason v. Hackett, 4 Nev. 420; 
In re Andersen's Estate, 198 Pac. 236, (Okl.) ; 
Parchen v. Andierson, 5· Pac. 588 (Mont.); 
Michener v. Fransham, 81 Pac. 953 (Mont.) ; 
Beard v. Rowland et al., 81 Pac. 188 (Kan.) ; 
Wade v. Hornaday, 140 Pac. 870 (Kan.); 
Weiland v. Sell, 109 Pac. 771 (Kan.); 
Tate v. Crooks, 68 Pac. 74; 
47 Corp. Jur., 667-674, sees. 61-66. 
Many a corporation or business concern makes ar-
rangements by which its employees get a share of the prof-
its to stimulate effort, without bringing them into partner-
ship or joint ownership of the business. 
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We shall not persevere to sketch the evidence under 
the many different issues in the pleadings. The issues are 
too numerous, the testimony too voluminous, the work of 
segregation too great. There was evidence upon which the 
trial court could and should have made findings of fact re-
sponsive to each of the issues. And it should then have 
decreed the recreant party or parties to account to the 
other. Nevertheless we find it inexpedient to leave the 
entire field of evidence and proceedings during the trial 
as a sort of terra incognito in view of its bearing upon 
certain of the questions subsequently arising for discussion 
in this brief. 
In summary, therefore, we may say that there was am-
ple evidence in the record to have sustained findings of fact 
by the court to the following effect. Beginning with the 
first Hill Field job early in April, 1942, referred to above, 
and spaced at intervals thereafter during the months of 
April, May and June, 1942, there were several "small jobs" 
as they were termed by the parties, that came up, and the 
work was done by men and equipment furnished either by 
defendant Newman himself or by others that were hired 
and paid for by defendant's funds provided for meeting 
the pay roll. They were jobs running in amount from 
$550.00 to $3,500.00. Most of these small jobs were upon 
contracts or agreements made and undertaken by defen-
dant Newman in his own name and on his responsibility. 
But in the case of two or three of them they were procured 
and taken by plaintiffs in their names, being put in the 
way of obtaining them by their employment on the New-
man jobs. But the means of performance of each and all 
of them were provided by defendant's funds to meet the 
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pay rolls. In some of them he provided the major part of 
the equipment and trucks himself; in others he hired and 
paid them. In the force of men and trucks employed, the 
plaintiffs had and furnished one truck each, for which they 
were paid a rental compensation on the same basis as the 
rentals paid for other trucks employed on the jobs, as part 
of the expenses of doing the work. The plaintiffs were 
employed on these jobs to supervise them, keep account of 
the men and equipment employed, the amounts earned by 
each, see that they were kept steadily at work and make 
reports to defendant Newman who frequently made running 
trips for personal inspection and return to his other and 
larger jobs in which the plaintiffs had no concern. It was 
also part of plaintiffs' employment duties to look after such 
matters as repairs and supplies of oil, grease and gas to 
keep the trucks in running order. Instead of being paid a 
.stated salary for these services they were given each a one-
third share of the net profits after all bills were paid. And 
a settlement was made with them at the end of each job, or 
as soon as the returns from the work came in, and they were 
.paid accordingly by defendant Newman. 
As stated, the jobs were small ones, requiring only 
from about a week to two or three weeks per job to com-
plete them. So that they were not kept constantly employed, 
but recurrently as each job came up or presented itself arid 
the contract taken. To summarize each of these jobs in 
turn: 
The First Hill Field Job 
(See partial summary ante p. 26.) 
Newman testified: 
"I furnished most of the equipment up there. 
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Figuring all the way through I always had anyway 
ten times more equipment than they did. I hired 
most of it all the way through. I was the fellow who 
was known. I got people to work for me. They liked 
to work for me. I maintained all the pay rolls. I did 
this on the first Hill Field job. 
"Mr. Dunkley was supposed to have been the 
bookkeeper and time keeper. I had Mr. Bacon em-
ployed as bookkeeper but he had too much work to 
do, I knew he was getting back on it. 
"I collected the money and divided the profit 
with them." (Rec. pp. 206-7.) 
The Second Hill Field Job 
Dunkley testified: 
"This job was about a week after the first Hill 
Field job. Capt. Beener wanted some trucks as on 
the previous job. The job was in Victor Newman's 
name. We worked ten days or so. I turned in the 
time, Mr. Bacon made the checks, and they were paid 
through Mr. Newman. Some capital was necessary 
and Mr. Newman furnished that. We completed the 
job and split the profit equally. Mr. Newman had 
several jobs of his own that we didn't have anything 
to do with." (Rec. pp. 120-1, 155-7.) 
Newman testified: 
"I maintained the payrolls for everything. I 
paid the money for trucks on all the various jobs. 
When I got through with this second job I never 
charged the job at all. In fact I did it more to help 
Huber out because he was a good friend of mine. I 
never mingled it with my other pay-rolls because I 
wanted Mr. Dunkley to keep the payrolls separate 
and apart from my other line of business. My book-
keeper was overworked." (Rec. pp. 207-8.) 
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The McKee Job 
Dunkley: 
"Next after the second Hill Field job was the 
McKee job. The job was a sub-contract in Huber 
and Dunkley's name and the arrangement was the 
same as on the previous jobs. A rental was paid for 
equipment and any profits were split between the 
three of us. Mr. Newman took care of the pay roll. 
The contract was at 22 cts. a yard and the total price 
$1800 or $2000." (Rec. 121-2, 157-8.) 
Newman: 
On this job I quoted the price and everything 
but apparently they took it in their names. I main-
tained the payrolls and everything. They kept the 
accounts and I shared the profit with them, over 
the equipment expense. 
"I had plenty to do in my regular work or busi-
ness. I had several big jobs. Mr. Poulson, president 
of American Contractors, would call me up and say: 
'Vic, you can do this. Why don't you do this. You 
can move more dirt around here than any contractor 
in the intermountain district. You can get a way to 
get this stuff moved.' And I figured I was more or 
less doing Huber a favor because they couldn't get 
equipment in 1942. 
"The same was true as to the Poulson job and 
the Supply Depot job." (Rec. pp. 209, 210.) 
The· Poulson Construction Co. Job 
Dunkley: 
"After the McKee job, Mr. Newman took an-
other job at Hill Field from the Poulson Construc-
tion Co. The same arrangements with Mr. N.ewman 
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as on the previous jobs, split the profit three ways 
after the bills were paid. The contract was for $3500 
at so much per yard." (Rec. 122, 160-1.) 
The Supply Depot Job 
Dunkley: 
"That was a contract for about $1200. I fur-
nished one truck and was paid for it. These were 
all short jobs ; none lasted over 2 or 3 weeks. A 
satisfactory settlement was made." (Rec. pp. 161, 
163.) 
The Roy, Utah Job 
Dunkley: 
Witness testified to this job in the same terms 
as he did to the last one, the Supply Depot job. 
THE COURT: I am listening to this only to 
show the nature of their dealings in the past in 
order to try and determine their relations on the 
three jobs that we have here in dispute. (Rec. 164-6.) 
Newman: 
"They were successful in landing a small job 
from Tom Rowlands at Roy, Utah, and we shared 
a small profit on that. I was up there several times 
checking on it to see if they were making or losing 
money." (Rec. 210, 211.) 
The Stearns--Rogers Job 
Dunkley: 
"That was a contract job of Mr. Newman's at 
8th South and 6th West streets. Check was made 
to Huber and Dunkley. We received all the proceeds, 
Mr. Newman took care of the pay roll. That job was 
about $550. We asked him for an accounting, to 
know how much was spent; he has to know how 
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much the job cost him. We held the check there and 
finally when we needed the money at Wen dover it 
was put into the fund to help pay the help there. I 
deposited it in the Huber & Dunkley bank account. 
That was about the middle of June (1942) ." (Rec. 
pp. 167-9.) 
The above completes the list of small jobs transacted 
under the arrangements between these parties during the 
three months of April-May-June, 1942. Satisfactory settle-
ments were made on each of them unless it be the last one, 
which leaves the account open as to the $550 and the final 
use of that sum by the plaintiffs. The testimony was offered 
and considered by the court only to throw any light there-
from on the subsequent dealings between the parties. There 
was no direct connection between the different jobs. Each 
arose in its turn, the work done and settlements were made 
without reference to any possible future jobs. 
JOBS MENTIONED IN THE PLEADINGS 
Now we take up the four jobs mentioned in the plead-
ings in their order of time of commencement of each, viz.: 
The Fort Douglas job, the Harrison-Dorman job, the rail-
road job, and the Hospital job. The Fort Douglas job is 
the last mentioned in the pleadings (see fourth defense 
and counter-claim, Rec. pp. 56-59) but was first commenced 
(after completion of the last of the sundry small jobs men-
tioned supra). It was begun about the last day of June or 
first of July, 1942. The plaintiffs worked on it as employees 
of the defendant but on the understanding that he would 
divide the clear profits with them in return for their careful 
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and effective supervision of the work and the keeping of 
careful and accurate accounts of the work done, and do a 
complete job. They worked on it about two weeks, then re-
port~d to defendant that the job was complete, at a net 
profit of $5,400. The defendant was highly gratified, be-
lieving the job to be complete, and paid them $1,000 apiece 
pending a settlement with the prime contractors, Jacobson 
Construction Company, and moved the plaintiffs to a larger 
and more responsible job at Wendover, Utah, where he was 
just about closing a contract for heavy construction work 
with the Harrison-Dorman Construction Company, esti-
mated to cost when complete about $25,000. There were 
special circumstances and conditions attending this job 
which caused defendant to let the plaintiffs in on it under 
a special profit sharing agreement, that were not present in 
any of the other jobs, before or after. (See post p. 39.) 
This was about the middle of July, 1942, when the work on 
this job was started. It was never completed. Dunkley 
testified that he and Huber worked on this Harrison-Dor-
man job about three weeks, when they quit. (Rec. pp. 38-39.) 
It may have been a little longer than three weeks that 
plaintiffs worked on this Harrison-Dorman job, unless they 
stopped work on it before defendant withdrew his men and 
equipment, for the latter worked on it somewhat longer. 
Then he also suspended work on it, due to lack of some 
allocated material required for the job which the prime 
contractors could not obtain, and they could not allow New-
man to get ahead on his deliveries of material. During this 
enforced suspension of work, defendant Newman took the 
other two jobs mentioned in the pleadings, viz.; the rail-
road job of $2,900, and the Hospital job calling for a dirt 
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fill for a government hospital at Wendover and other haul-
age to the total amount of 100,000 cubic yards at 59 cents 
per cubic yard. Then the plaintiffs were put to work on 
these jobs by defendant. But there is evidence that owing 
to dissatisfaction with plaintiffs' work, and other causes, 
the defendant about the middle of August, 1942, gave plain-
tiffs to understand that the profit sharing feature was 
through, and out of the picture; and that if they wanted 
to continue at work for him on a weekly salary of $100 a 
week they could do so; e~se they could quit. They did con-
tinue at work on that agreement until on or about Sept. 
3rd, 1942, when Huber stopped and went at something else. 
But Dunkley worked two or three weeks longer at $100 a 
week, then he quit; and there have been no further dealings 
between he or Huber and defendant Newman. And New-
man did not finally complete the hospital job until January, 
21, 1943, which he did on his sole responsibility, cost and 
expense. 
We now summarize the testimony of both Dunkley 
(Huber did not testify) and Newman with respect to each 
of these four jobs mentioned in the pleadings, viz.: 
The Fort Douglas Job 
Dunkley: 
"We next went to the Fort Douglas job, the 
contract for which was taken by Mr. Newman in his 
own name from Jacobson Construction Company, at 
the contract price of $10,000. Mr. Newman says: 
'Let's, go up and take the job,'-whch means the 
same as any other job. Yes, that job was bid and 
accepted while I was out at the Stearns-Rogers job. 
Huber and I supervised the job. I told the fellows 
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what to do and where to work, kept the time from 
day to day, and gave it to Mr. Bacon (Newman's 
bookkeeper). All I did was relaying the information 
to him ; he was supposed to keep track of it and 
know how much we had coming. Mr. Newman paid 
each of us $1000 on that job; then we went over to 
Wendover." (Rec. 167-8.) 
(This witness also spoke of himself as a partner 
on this job, but this was a mere conclusion from un-
stated facts, to be stricken out or disregarded. Shep-
ard v. Pratt, 16 Kan. 209; 27 Pac. Stat. Rep. 209.) 
Newman: 
In June, 1942, I had a contract at Fort Douglas 
for the grading of six or seven acres. My bid of 
$10,000 for the job was accepted. At the time I was 
terribly busy on a job at Kearns for Gibbons & Reed 
Construction Co. So I says to Ralph Dunkley, I am 
going to rough grade this off. I can get a plenty of 
equipment. All that Huber and Dunkley had was a 
truck apiece. I told them to hire any truck they 
could find. They supervised the job, but did not 
stay on the job until completed. They reported to 
me that it was completed at an expense of only $4600 
showing a profit of $5400. I figured that was about 
half profit. I said, that's fine; are you sure the job 
is going to pass inspection? They said, oh, yes. I 
gave them $1000 apiece. 
"They reported it was finished and left the. job. 
I later discovered that it wasn't finished. Capt. 
Harris forced me back up there. The job was stymied 
up there for a week. I had to pay out $2800 besides 
the use of my equipment to finish it. They misrepre-
sented when they said the job made money and I 
gave them $2000. They took all the profits and I 
didn't quite break even. Think I lost $400 or $500." 
(Rec. 211-215, 230.) 
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The Harrison-Dorman Job 
The contract for this job was taken by defendant New-
man with the Harrison Construction Company about the 
middle of July, 1942, about the time plaintiffs stopped work 
on the Fort Douglas job, and before it was known they had 
"fluked" him on the Fort Douglas job and gotten away with 
all the profits. They still had Newman's confidence, and 
were regarded as his friends. He thought he could now 
trust them with a little more responsibility and on a larger 
job. And there were special features of this job that led 
Newman to cut them in for a profit that was not present in 
the other jobs. 
The parties testified : 
Dunkley: 
"Mr. Newman took the contract on the Harrison-
norman job and Huber and I went over to Wendover 
and worked on it, the same as on any· other job that 
we had had previous, and the arrangements were 
the same. (Rec. 123, 129.) 
"Under the arrangem·ents the equipment rental 
would be paid, nobody would draw a salary, we would 
devote our time and efforts, and the profits split 
three ways. That was to be our compensation. (Rec. 
125, 178.) 
"The contract was 80 cents a yard for fill and 
$2.80 a yard for concrete aggregate. That was bid 
by Mr. Newman and he received the contract on it. 
I did the same work as on every other job. (Rec. 
17·9.) 
"I stayed on the Harrison-Dorman job three 
weeks. I did not finish it. I never went back to the 
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job and don't know whether Newman did, nor what 
he did after I left. (Rec. 186.) 
"The Curtis Gravel Co. completed the job. We 
intended to finish it but started work on the hospital 
job, and didn't go back on the Harrison-Dorman job 
any more. (Rec. 189, 190.) 
"On this Harrison-Dorman job the sand and 
gravel, called aggregate, came from across the line 
in Nevada." (Rec. 197.) 
Newman: 
"On the Harrison-Dorman job. Huber had an 
I. C. C. right to haul aggregate from Nevada into 
Utah. He is the only one who had that right, and at 
that time that was the only aggregate that was avail-
able in Wendover. So I couldn't bid on the job to 
furnish aggregate without Huber hauling it. I bid 
the price to Harrison-Dorman at $2.80 a yard. 
"So I says to Ed (Huber), 'Look, Ed, that is 
about half fill and half aggregate. We will go in on 
that together. You furnish the aggregate and I will 
furnish the fill. We will use our trucks on the fill 
2 or 3 days, and then you take all of them and haul 
the aggregate over.' He says, 'that is fine.' 
"I says: 'You have got the aggregate and I have 
got the equipment to make this earth fill in there. 
We will run the jobs together and split the profits. 
We will give Dunkley a third of it if he will keep 
accurate books of how much it costs to haul the 
aggregate, and how much it costs to haul the fill.' So 
that was the set up. 
"That was a big job at the time. It was $25,000 
if we finished it. But that was separate from these 
other little jobs. 
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"We were on that job roughly a month or more. 
I furnished the money for the payrolls, all except 
$284. I entered into the contract with Harrison-
norman Construction Company. The contract was 
solely with m~. I took care of the payroll. 
"For the first couple of weeks on that job Ralph 
(Dunkley) would write out the checks and I would 
sign them. But there were times when I was work-
ing at the Airport and couldn't get out there. So, 
Ralph Dunkley says, 'why didn't I put some money 
in bank and let him make the pay roll with it.' So 
I says, 'all right.' They got a Huber & Dunkley check 
book made. They never had one up to that time. 
And I deposited in bank about $12,000 in their ac-
count on the Harrison-Dorman job, and they wrote 
out the payroll. 
"Q. What progress was made on the Harrison-
norman job? 
"A. For lack of some allocated steel material 
the job stopped. We couldn't haul any more dirt. 
We did not finish the job. They raised the job,-
made it bigger than it was at first. 
"We got some estimates from the army engineers 
out there. One part of it was 100% done, another 
was 80%, and one 5.0%. The whole should have been 
about 65% complete. We left it because we couldn't 
do any more until they got this allocated material. 
"Q. I suppose they paid you for what you had 
done? 
"A. No, we still have it coming. The Harrison-
norman job definitely lost $7000. I told Huber and 
Dunkley how much money I had taken in on that job, 
which was $15,900, and we spent out $22,000. (Rec. 
pp. 215-219, 228-9.) 
"I think Harrison-Dorman finally took a little 
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more dirt down there. They were hauling material 
to three jobs from one pit. (Rec. 219, 220.) 
"They (Huber and Dunkley) said, 'We are 
getting paid barrow-pit, we are selling some to the 
Geer job, some to the Harrison-Dorman job, and 
some to the railroad job.'" (Rec. 220.) 
NOTE: The Geer job here mentioned by the witness was not 
one of the jobs mentioned in the pleadings, and no ac-
counting was sought in respect of it. From later testi-
mony it appears that this was a sort of side job or specu-
lation undertaken by plaintiffs on their own account, 
financed out of Newman's funds and equipment, but pro-
ceeds appropriated to their own use, and no accounting 
made to defendant on it. 
The Hospital Job 
Dunkley: 
"We had the same arrangements with Mr. New-
man on this job as on every other job. It was taken 
on a straight contract in Mr. Newman's name and on 
his bid of 59 cents per cubic yard, estimated to be 
$59,000 on 100,000 cubic yards. The last dirt on that 
job was hauled Sept. 3rd, 1942. I had one truck on 
that job at the agreed compensation of $3 per hour." 
(Rec. 190-192.) 
Newman: 
"When I left the Harrison-Dorman job I negoti-
ated another with Col. Thomas on the 'hospital job.' 
At that time I had no agreement with Huber and 
Dunkley as to the status of the Harrison-Dorman job. 
We thought we would figure up but we couldn't do 
nothing for three weeks, so I told Huber and Dunkley 
I would give them $100 a week to help me on the 
hospital job. That was about Aug. lOth when I was 
awarded the contract on the hospital job. (Rec. 219'-
220.) 
"This conversation that I had with Huber and 
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Dunkley, at their trailer house, was between the lOth 
and 15th of August. I said, I have lost money on the 
last two jobs; I am going to try to get back the 
money I had lost, off of the hospital job. I am not 
going to share no profits. If you want to work for 
m-e for $100 a week, all right; if not, all right. (Rec. 
270-271.) 
"In this conversation in the trailer, I just told 
them that the two jobs lost money, and that if they 
·couldn't run them at a profit !would like to make 
other arrangements. I told them they could work for 
me at $100 a week. (Rec. 276.) 
"I told them that I wasn't going to share the 
profits with them; that I was going to buy a shovel 
from the hospital job. For this $100 a week Mr. Huber 
was to be foreman on the job. He didn't like it. He 
didn't say whether he would work or wouldn't. I told 
them that is what they would get if they wanted to 
work. (Rec. 2'77-278.) 
"I told them definitely before the hospital job was 
started that they were not to share in the profits, if 
there were any profits. I knew they were inefficient 
by Aug. 15th, but all these jobs were run together for 
15 days. There were four jobs all tangled up together, 
and I told them, I says: 'Finish these jobs and keep 
separate accounts of it.' (Rec. 297, 299, 301.) 
"I figured that I had to hire them because these 
other jobs were not completed; the Harrison-Dorman 
job, for instance. I thought if they would stay there 
and do as I directed them for $100 a week, I could get 
by until the Harrison-Dorman job and the railroad 
job were completed. And I figured that I could make 
enough money out of the hospital job to compensate me 
for the loss that I incurred while they were running 
the Harrison-Dorman job for me,-a loss of $7,000; 
and the railroad job, a loss of $400 and some dollars. 
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In fact they were all losses except the Hospital job, 
and that just about evened up the losses. They were 
supposed to be my friends, to that time. I knew they 
hadn't made me any money, but I knew that they could 
if they did the work as I directed it. (Rec. 279-281.) 
"I knew they had the ability to do the job right 
if they wanted to, and I thought if they would work for 
me by the week and be satisfied, and do as I directed, 
I would make some money. (Rec. 283.) 
"When I told them they could work on for me at 
$100 a week, Huber said he wouldn't do it, or he didn't 
want any part of it, or something. (Rec. 271.) 
"Q. Did they work for nothing between Aug. 
10th-11th-12th and Sept. 1st? 
"A. Between Aug. 15th and Sept. 1st we had 
about fifteen trucks employed, and they worked on the 
Harrison-Dorman job, the railroad job, the hospital 
job, and the Geer job. There were four jobs and they 
worked on all of them. (Rec. 270-271.) 
"Huber and Dunkley both started to work for me 
at $100 a week when the hospital job started,-Dunk-
ley also at $100 a week; though Huber said he didn't 
like it. (Rec. 274-5.) 
"Huber didn't like me saying that; he started 
making arrangements for a job at Wendover right 
after that. He spent most of his time after that mak-
ing preparations for that job. (Rec. 221.) 
"Q. What did Dunkley say? 
"A. He just kept on keeping the books, at $100 
a week. 
"Q. Where are the checks showing he received 
$100 a week from Aug. 12th to Sept. 1st? 
"A. I would like to look at the date of the checks. 
I deposited the money in bank for him to run it, and 
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I don't know how much he paid himself, nor Huber 
either. I have never seen his checks. I don't know 
whether he paid Huber $100 a week, or nothing a 
week, for what little time he was there. I would go 
out two or three times a week and Huber wasn't there. 
"THE COURT: I wonder if you can find the 
checks for $100 a week for August, Mr. Morrissey? 
"MR. MORRISSEY: No. Those checks in Aug-
ust were probably drawn from the account in Walker 
Brothers Bank in the name of Huber & Dunkley, if 
drawn. Our checks for Huber and Dunkley are in 
September. 
"MR. CALISTER: We have every check issued 
by Huber & Dunkley all the time they were on the 
hospital job as well as on the Harrison-Dorman job 
and they will be available to the referee if appointed. 
(Rec. 274-5.) 
NOTE: The court did not request Mr. Callister to produce 
the checks for $100 a week in his possession for inspec-
tion. 
"I bid the thing contract measurement. Huber 
and Dunkley switched on the blow-over and started 
hauling dirt on the hospital job. But they were not 
giving tickets of the measurements out. That went 
along roughly two or three weeks; they were hauling 
material on the hospital job, and the railroad job, and 
to the Harrison-Dorman job which finally took some 
more dirt down there. They were hauling material 
to the three jobs from the same pit. (Rec. 219, 220), 
and also to the Geer job." (Dunkley, Rec. p. 124.) 
Dunkley: 
"I acted as bookkeeper on the hospital job and 
kept a day-by-day record of the cubic yardage on 
that fill from Aug. 11th to Aug. 25th. There was no 
actual yardage record kept because when the work 
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started Mr. Howe the resident engineer gave Huber 
and myself the impression that they were going to 
measure it by barrow-pit measurement. Therefore 
there were no load tickets given out on the actual 
yardage hauled there." (Rec. 338-339.) 
Newman: 
"I went out there myself, and I said: 'How are 
you hauling?' 'How are we getting paid?' They said, 
'We are getting paid barrow-pit, the army engineers 
is paying; we are selling some to the Geer job, some 
to the Harrison-Dorman job, and some to the railroad 
job.' (Rec. 220.) 
"There were four jobs all tangled up together. 
I told them, I says, 'Finish these jobs, keep separate 
accounts of it.' I would go out, and they would be 
hauling on the hospital job. Then I found out they 
were working on the Geer job, and all these jobs 
were scattered out and they were all jumbled up and 
jumbled together. (Rec. 300.) 
"I told them the hospital job was mine, and they 
mixed them all up. They were not to share profits 
on the hospital job until the time I let them go, no. 
That was the understanding we had when the hos-
pital job started that they were not to. They mixed 
them all up, and that is where the trouble came. (Rec. 
300-1.) 
"There were no profits on the railroad job. I 
agreed to share profits with them on the Harrison-
Dorman job only. There was never no understanding 
on the railroad job. But there was no profits on the 
railroad job. 
"They collected and kept the money on the Geer 
job themselves. I paid the pay roll and everything, 
they took the money and kept it. I met the pay roll, 
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figuring it was on the Harrison-Dorman job or the 
hospital job. (Rec. 272-274.) 
"I severed all connections with tb,em about the 
last of August, 1942. I was devoting my time to the 
hospital job. I finished the hospital job January 21, 
1943. They left me Sept. 3rd, 1942. Mr. Dunkley 
worked for me two weeks after that. I have can-
celled checks showing $100 a week I gave him, dated 
Sept. 6th, lOth, 16th. 
"MR. CALLISTER: I don't think there is any 
controversy about that. Mr. Dunkley testified to 
that. (Rec. 219-220.) 
"The hospital job contract was for 100,000 yards 
of fill. I had a lot of trouble trying to get an estimate. 
So the army engineers- said, 'Why don't you finish 
your haul?' I says, 'All right, I will finish the haul 
for 31,000 that was still owing on the hospital job.' 
And I hauled that to the various locations on the 
Wendover air base as the army engineers directed. 
So the original hospital job contract was not finished 
until Jan. 21, 1943. The dirt that was hauled after 
Sept. 16th went to various locations, but I had to do 
it in order to get my money from the army engineers. 
(Rec. 239, 240.) 
"Up until Oct. 19th I had one fair bookkeeper 
who was overworked. I kept getting so much work 
that I realized I had to get some competent book-
keeper. So I got Mr. Keyes and Mr. Wiscomb from 
Salt Lake County shops, and they came out to run 
my work. The first month they were in my employ 
all they did was to rectify the mistakes that were 
made on those other three jobs. Everything had to 
be changed that Mr. Dunkley did. I directed him 
how to keep the books, but he did not do as I told him. 
I paid him $100 a week, but I didn't find this out 
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until later. I was taking too much for granted. (Rec. 
282.) 
"The Harrison-Dorman job wasn't run sepa-
rately from the other jobs that were going on at the 
same time. (Dunkley, Rec. 180.) 
"Approximately the 25th of August Mr. New-
man told me definitely he did not want to do any 
more business with me. At that time we were on 
the hospital job. I did not leave it then but at the 
end of the job both Huber and I did. That job was 
completed,-the last dirt hauled,-on Sept. 3rd, 1942. 
(Dunkley, Rec. 134, 195.) 
"After the hospital job we just agreed not to 
take any more jobs together. We each had jobs of 
our own, so we just made the remark that we 
wouldn't take any more jobs together. (Dunkley, Rec. 
195.) 
"I was on the pay roll working for Mr. Newman 
after that. The hospital job was completed then. I 
worked for Mr. Newman 21;2 weeks after the hos-
pital job was completed on Sept. 3rd, 1942." (Dunk-
ley, Rec. 195.) 
The Railroad Job 
Dunkley: 
NOTE: There was no testimony from Dunkley about the 
arrangements with Newman for working on this job. But 
there is an occasional reference in his testimony to his 
doing work on that job along with, or at the same time, 
that he was working on the Harrison-Dorman job and the 
Hospital job. (The Author.) 
Newman: 
"Q. Did you have any dealings with Huber and 
Dunkley about the railroad job? 
"A. No. I had better explain. The railroad 
job was another small job. They can either say that 
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they were or were not on that job, it is immaterial, 
because the job definitely lost $300 or $400. There 
was never no set agreement that they were in it., 
"My shovels loaded the dirt, my bull-dozers scat-
tered the dirt, and different trucks hauled it. Re-
gardless of whether they paid them or I paid them, 
it was all my money. The total amount was $2,900. 
They left the job when it was about %tJhs completed. 
I didn'1t say I was going to split the profits with 
Huber and Dunkley on 'those jobs,' no. The railroad 
job was solely my job alone." (Rec. 223, 228, 230.) 
The foregoing were all the jobs mentioned in the plead-
ings. The Geer job was a small job of $1192 taken by 
Dunkley on the side while he was performing the duties 
of his employment by Mr. Newman on the Harrison-Dorman 
and Hospital jobs, and not embraced in the pleadings. The 
payroll expenses were paid by Huber and Dunkley by their 
checks on the bank account in which Newman had deposited 
over $12,000 to finance the payrolls on the other jobs. They 
kept the proceeds and made no accounting. For further par-
ticulars of the Geer job, see ante pp. 41-45. 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE COURT 
There is one noticeable and outstanding feature of the 
trial that should not, we assume, be overlooked entirely. 
That was the lengthy and persevering cross-examination 
of defendant Newman by the Court. At the conclusion of 
the trial, when counsel for both sides had rested and said 
"That is all," the court indicated that it desired to ask Mr. 
Newman some questions. The questions asked extended over 
the entire range of testimony already covered by counsel 
on both sides on direct and cross-examination. It must have 
consumed more than an hour of time of the trial. It ex-
tends from page 262 to 298 of the record. The writer 
hereof was not of counsel at the trial. But on reading the 
transcript he is tempted to feel that the court went to 
unusual and unjustified lengths. The apparent trend and 
scope of the questions was to corner the witness and drive 
him into admissions at variance with portions of his testi-
mony which we have quoted (ante pp. 26-48), and in line 
with a conception denoted by the form of the questions 
asked, to wit: that all and each of the jobs at issue in the 
pleadings were done under and pursuant to one uniform 
agreement amounting to a partnership, because of the profit 
sharing feature; that the services of the plaintiff were the 
same in each job; and that they each came to an end on 
or about September 3rd, 1942. The court was not altogether 
successful in this quest. Again and again the witness re-
fused assent and returned answers consistent with his 
previous testimony. Each time the questioner returned to 
the attack with questions framed to contain assumptions 
not always justified by the witness' previous answers. All 
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in all the witness seems to have done more harm in his 
answers to the theory on which the questions were framed 
than to improve it, notwithstanding the few assents near 
the last apparently from sheer weariness. The writer 
understands the circumspection required in speaking of 
such a situation. Perhaps the most suitable criterion could 
be obtained in this way, viz.: The members of this court 
are all experienced trial court judges. Should they feel 
inclined to read through said pages 262-298 of the record 
and note their own reactions, they would probably corre-
spond with that which the writer has experienced. 
We think the historic role of a trial court is to act as 
impartial umpire between the contending parties, and leave 
the questioning of witnesses to the respective counsel. 
At the conclusion of the second day's trial the follow-
ing occurred : 
DISCUSSIONS AND RULINGS 
THE COURT: It seems to me that these were 
joint ventures on all these jobs mentioned in the com· 
plaint; that is, the railroad job, the hospital job and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
the Harrison-Dorman job. The hospital job up to 
Sept. 3rd. 
MR. CALLISTER: I don't think a partner can 
cut off some one else and just say that up to this 
point we are through. 
THE COURT: Here is the thing about that, 
though, that Mr. Dunkley at least did accept employ-
ment at the rate of $100 a week after that. And he 
did quit even that employment at a little later date. 
(Rec. 303.) 
MR. CALLISTER: That is right, but Mr. Huber 
at no time did. 
THE COURT: If one partner in a three-way 
partnership leaves, that dissolves the whole partner-
ship. Now with respect to Mr. Newman and Mr. 
Huber on the balance, there would have to be a new 
understanding at that time. 
MR. CALLISTER: You take the position that 
it is a dissolution at the time one leaves the partner~ 
ship? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CALLISTER: I assume your honor will 
appoint a referee. (Rec. 304.) 
THE COURT: Is there any evidence as to when 
the Harrison-Dorman job was finished? 
MR. CALLISTER : There was some evidence 
that it was never finished; they stopped for some 
reason and never went back. 
THE COURT: The Curtis Sand & Gravel Co. 
finished it. I think this joint venture terminated on 
Sept. 3rd. I think all the evidence here is Sept. 3rd. 
On Sept. 3rd the joint venture in all these operations 
ceased at that time. 
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MR. MORRISSEY: Up to the F·ort Douglas 
there is no controversy. 
THE COURT: That is right. (Rec. 305.) 
THE COURT: Now the Fort Douglas job, I 
think your counter-claim comes into being. I think 
everything prior to that job was settled satisfactorily. 
There should be a referee appointed to take an ac-
counting of the jobs mentioned in the complaint and 
counter-claim and the profits, if any, divided one-
third each. (Rec. 306.) 
Now, on the hospital job I think they will have 
to attempt to figure as near as possible the amount 
of profit or loss up to Sept. 3rd * * * I think 
the apportionment of the hospital job can be done 
before the referee, .and then these gentlemen can be 
sworn and testify to whatever the percentage was 
that was finished on a certain date. 
And the referee shall hear evidence to determine 
the result of the accounting, and after he has made 
his report to the court, the court will thereafter hear 
any obdections to the court's proposed findings, 
which will be based on the referee's report. (Rec. 
307.) 
Can you gentlemen agree upon a referee? 
MR. CALLISTER : Has the court anyone in 
mind? 
T'HE COURT: No. I will want you to prepare· 
findings in the nature of an interlocutory decree. 
Would you gentlemen want to think over who you 
want for a couple of days·? 
(Counsel say they have no one in mind.) 
THE COURT: Think about it; maybe you can 
agree. If you can, just insert the same. 
(The Court recesses or adjourns for the day.) 
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With respect to the court's observation that it seemed 
to the court that "all these jobs mentioned in the complaint 
were joint ventures," we have to say that this was at most 
a conclusion of law from facts that had not been found or 
stated in writing, as required by code 104-27-6. It did not 
purport to meet and dispos·e of all or any of the issues 
framed in the complaint, answer and counterclaims. It 
did not constitute a finding of fact upon all or any of the 
evidence within the issues, nor upon the evidence which 
we have quoted or summarized in the preceding pages. Had 
the court made a written finding of fact in response to the 
issue whether a partnership had been created by acts or 
words of the parties, and had decided that upon those facts 
a partnership, or a joint venture, had resulted; then we 
could have assigned as error that the finding is unsupported 
by evidence, or is contrary to undisputed evidence, or con-
trary to the great preponderance and weight of the evi-
dence. Or, had it found upon evidence within the issues 
that defendant had breached his duty as a partner, or a 
joint adventurer, creating a duty to account, we could have 
laid error to that finding. Likewise on each of the other 
issues, both in the complaint, answer and counter-claim, 
both affirmative and negative, an express and specific writ-
ten finding of fact was required, with conclusions of law, 
and a decree that one party account to the other. 
The findings should also have conformed to the impli-
cation in the court's remarks, that the joint venture came 
to an end on September 3rd, 1942. The court indicated 
that it desired to make findings and a decree that one party 
or the other should account. It invited plaintiffs' counsel 
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to prepare such findings. But none were ever prepared, 
served, signed, or filed, so as to become part of the judg-
ment roll and record on appeal. 
Until adequate findings of fact responsive to each issue 
in the pleadings, both affirmative and negative, were pre-
pared, signed, and filed, it was premature for the court to 
even consider the appointment of a referee to take and state 
an account. To actually make such an order without find-
ings and decree was error both jurisdictional and pro.. 
cedural. See ante pages 14-18. 
Nevertheless, there was a minute order entry by the 
clerk purporting to appoint a referee (Rec. 72), dated 
April 6, 1942; and later a formal written order appointing 
Wallace Dansie to act as referee dated April 24, 1942 (Rec. 
74-76). 
Aside from the foregoing there were no further pro-
ceedings in the action, and no filings made, until June 3, 
1942, when the court resumed its sittings in this case, as 
denoted by the bill of exceptions (Rec. 309). 
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THE ORDER OF REFERENCE 
Without any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or 
decree to account, the court on April 24, 1942, twelve days 
after the court recessed on April 6th, 1943, entered a 
minute order (Rec. p. 77) and on the same day a more 
formal written order appointing Mr. Wallace Dansie ref-
eree of the court in this action (Rec. pp. 74-76), requiring 
the parties to appear before him and submit their books 
and papers. The order was void because without jurisdic-
tion, in that there were no findings of fact, or conclusions 
upon evidence within the issues in the pleadings establish-
ing partnership or other relation, or any breach of duty aris-
ing therefrom, and no decree ordering that either party 
account to the other. It was void for the further reason 
that, had such findings, conclusions and decree to account 
been previously made, it would have required that the 
party liable and decreed to account, forthwith file a state-
ment of his account with the opposing party, showing sep-
arately the debits and credits in account; i.e., the receipts 
and disbursements. And the opposite party would there-
upon have been required to move or plead to such account, 
file objections to specific items, and (if desired) to file 
any counter-statement of account claiming additional items 
of credit or debit supplementing those in the statement 
first filed. That is, each party would "surcharge and falsi-
fy" the items in the opposing statement of account, accord-
ing to settled equity or chancery practice. That is, the par-
ties would be required to plead and come to an issue or 
issues affecting specific items of the account filed, on the 
one hand, and on specific items in the counter statement 
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of account, if any, on the other. This was the settled prac-
tice before the codes, of which the code references are the 
continuation and counterpart. The referee under the code is 
said to be a substitute for the old master in chancery with 
the same powers and duties unless otherwise specifically 
prescribed by law. See cases cited below. 
"The purpose of this requirement is to cause the 
parties to so plead as to limit the proofs on either 
side to the specific items in account as to which 
specific issue has been taken, and save the time of 
the court or referee on the trial of such issues." 
63 Corp. Jur., 720, References, sec. 110; 
Milt'on v. Richardson, 47 N. Y. Supp. 735; 
Moore v. Reinhart, 117 N. Y. Supp. 534; 
Myers v. Bennett, 3 Lea (71 Tenn.), 184; 
Wiggin v. Gans, 61 N.Y. Super. Ct., 646; 
1 Corp. Jur., Seg. page 684, note 15 and cases; 
53 Corp. Jur., page 735, note 2-3 et cit.; 
Fed. Eq. Rules, rule 79 (new rule 6v, 198 Fed. 
xxxvii); 
Beckwith v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 207 Fed. 
848. 
"The purpose of Equity Rule 79 (new rule 63, 
198 Fed. xxxvii) is to limit the trial before the master 
to the disputed items." 
Beckwith v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 207 Fed. 
848. 
"The parties should be required to furnish state-
ments of account so that the clerk and master may 
be able to see the points of real difference, and to 
limit the proofs to those points." 
Myers v. Bennett, and other cases supra. 
It may be that the court might, in its order of refer-
ence, instruct the referee to cause the parties to file their 
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statement, counter-statement, objections and exceptions be-
fore him, as a part of his duties under the order of refer-
ence, and so come to an issue or issues delimiting the proofs 
on the trial before him, and to report the same together 
with the proofs taken pursuant thereto, along with the 
referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and proposed 
decree, for action by the court. If so, no such order was 
made by the court in its order of reference. Nor was any 
such statement of account, counter account, objections to 
specific items, or other pleading filed either before the 
court or its referee. And so there was no cause pending for 
trial involving any items of account, or issues thereon, be-
fore either the court or the referee. And so there was no 
jurisdiction to proceed to the taking or settlement of an 
account by either the court or the referee. 
A court is without jurisdiction to conduct a trial of 
any issue of fact or law in the absence of a written plead-
ing defining the issue to be tried and limiting the proofs 
thereto. In the case of the original pleadings it is the com-
plaint, answer, counter-claim and reply which produce the 
issues, or a demurrer to any of these. At any later stage, 
or upon any collateral question, there must be some petition, 
affidavit or other verified statement of claim or account 
which defines or tenders the issue to be tried, and confers 
jurisdiction on the court. There must be some bounds, so 
that the evidence and findings of fact may conform to the 
issue to be tried. 
Hillyard v. District Court, 68 Utah 220; 249 
Pac. 806; 
Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 558; 37 Pac. 2d 777; 
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 14; 235 Pac. 580. 
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"No court has a right to go beyond the issues 
tried in rendering a judgment." 
Thompson v. Reynolds, 174 Pac. 164, 15·7 
(Utah); 
Rosenthyne v. McCulloch Co., 168 Pac. 957 
(Utah). 
"A court's jurisdiction depends upon a pleading 
as the judicial means of investigation, and a judg-
ment not supported by a sufficient pleading is void 
for all purposes and subject to collateral attack." 
In re Evans, 42 Utah 292; 130 Pac. 217. 
This view is apparent also from our code sections gov-
erning procedure before a referee. Section 104-27-6 em-
powers a referee among other things to permit admend-
ments to the pleadings. What pleadings? It cannot mean 
the original complaint and answer creating the issues as 
to relationship and breach of duty, upon the decision of 
which by the court depends a party's obligation to render 
an account to his adversary. Those issues have been or 
must be settled by the court's decree ordering one party to 
account to the other. Those issues must have gone to a 
decision and judgment, and the pleadings become functus 
officio before the case ever reaches a referee. Perhaps the 
decree to account has been affirmed on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Code section 104-27-6 could not have meant 
that the referee might go back and rip up the decree and 
permit admendments that would unsettle the court's decree. 
Manifestly, it means that the referee could permit amend-
ments to the pleadings which define the issue he is called 
upon to try, viz. : the statement of account and the disputed 
items thereof, filed in obedience to the decree to account. 
Inasmuch as there was never any petition, affidavit, 
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or statement of claim or account, or objections to items 
thereof, filed with the court, nor by the court's order filed 
with the referee defining or limiting issues in accounting 
to specific items of debit or credit in account, there was no 
jurisdiction to proceed to the trial of any such question. 
And the court could confer no such jurisdiction up'on the 
referee to try a non-existent issue of fact or law. The order 
of reference to Mr. Dansie as referee was therefore with-
out jurisdiction and void. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS JUNE 3RD, 1943 
Such was the state of the record when, on June 3rd, 
1943, the Court resumed its session in this case. There had 
been a two days trial, April 5th and 6th, 1943, on the issues 
as to partnership and liability to. account,' which the trial 
court had never decided by any findings of fact, conclusions 
or decree ordering either party to account to the other. 
There had been a court direction from the bench to plain-
tiffs' attorney to prepare findings of fact for an interlocu-
tory decree of some sort, which had not been complied with. 
There had been a two months vacation or recess, presum-
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ably to permit preparation of findings and decree to ac-
count, for approval and signature by the court, and to 
enable the referee to hold a trial, settle and state an account 
for report to the court, which could then hear exceptions 
to the referee's report, and allow or disallow items therein 
that might be excepted to by the parties. But none of these 
things had been done or transacted by the court or counsel. 
The case stood as on the day of adjournment. Not that the 
referee had been idle in the meantime. On the contrary the 
referee had conducted an inquiry of some sort, and had 
made a report to the court of his doings under the order 
of reference. This: report was dated May 28, 1943,-six 
days before the court resumed its session on June 3, 1943. 
But this report was not among the files of the case. As 
appeared later, it was in the pocket of plaintiffs' attorney. 
But judicially the court knew nothing of it when it convened 
again and began to hear testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses. 
To what purpose, and on what issue, did the court· 
convene again on June 3, 1943 to hear evidence? Certainly 
not to conduct again a trial on the question of partnership 
or employee relation of the plaintiffs toward the defendant, 
or breach of duty growing out of any such relationship. 
The court had finished the trial on those questions, an-
nounced its conclusions of law from the bench, and directed 
the plaintiffs attorney to prepare findings of fact and a 
decree. And the court must have intended that the decree 
would require one party or the other to account. Else, why 
the order of reference to take and state an account between 
the parties? However, the plaintiffs counsel had not pre-
pared or served any findings or proposed decree to account. 
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Hence the order of reference was void and in excess of 
jurisdiction. See cases cited ante pp. 14-19, 57. 
Upon what issues then did the trial court meet to con-
duct a trial and hear testimony on June 3rd, 1943? The 
only clue to the purpose of such a trial or hearing, was to 
be found in the nature of the testimony itself heard from 
the witness stand. That is, instead of a written pleading, 
petition, affidavit of fact, or statement of claim, with an-
swer, objections or plea,-defining the issues and limiting 
the proofs,-there was to be a complete reversal of the 
order of trial. And the court and counsel were to find out 
from the evidence what the issues were. Instead of verified 
definite issues limiting the proofs, the proofs were to formu-
late and define the issues as counsel proceeded with exam-
ination of his witnesses on the stand. When they got 
through the court and opposite party would be supposed to 
have found out what the trial was all about. 
There was no jurisdiction in the court to proceed in 
any such manner. Its attempt to do so was coram non judice 
and void. It is as if none of the witnesses had testified. 
This applies to all the testimony, rulings and proceedings 
recorded in the bill of exceptions from page 309 to 444 
inclusive. Because there was no written pleading or state-
ment of fact, and no issue thereon, there was no trial. 
A party sued or impleaded is entitled to have the issues 
defined by pleadings before he goes to trial thereon, so as 
to prepare his case and assemble his witnesses. He does 
not have to wait until his opponent has produced an array 
of witnesses and caused them to testify in open court in 
support of some theoretical and undefined issue of fact, 
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before he is obliged to put his own construction on what 
issue such testimony tends to support, and proceed to see 
what he can do in the way of getting witnesses to disprove 
or rebut before the court decides to end the trial and 
adjourn. 
What we have said applies to each and everything the 
plaintiffs sought to prove or establish at this second trial 
in the case on June 9, 1942. It applies with special force 
also to the document denominated on its face "NEWMAN, 
HUBER AND DUNKLEY REPORT ON ACCOUNTING," 
which plaintiffs' counsel finally decided to produce from 
his own custody and to offer in evidence as "Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit E" during the trial (see Rec. p. 316). To which the 
Court replied : "I wonder if it wouldn't be better to file it. 
It has been identified. I think it would be better to have it 
filed right in the case. It may be filed." (Rec. p. 316-7.) 
As an article of documentary evidence this exhibit E 
had no more effect than any of the other evidence offered at 
this hearing, in the absence of any written pleadings or 
issues of any sort limiting the proofs. The court had no 
jurisdiction to hear any proofs for lack of pleadings and 
an issue. The trial was a nullity, testimony and proofs like-
wise. 
Aside from that, what was the reason or excuse for try-
ing to introduce in evidence a referee's report. It was an 
unverified document containing numerous unsworn state-
ents of its author, Mr. Dansie. Even if sworn to, it would 
be only an affidavit, not a deposition taken on notice, or 
upon a dedimus with interrogatories attached, as required 
by the code in taking the deposition of an absent witness. 
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And even if these objeetions were out of the way it is not 
lawful to read a deposition in evidence unless the witness 
is absent and cannot be produced to testify at the trial. But 
in this case, the author of the document, deposition, unsworn 
statement (whatever it may be termed) was not absent, 
but was present on the witness stand and under examination 
as a witness at the very instant when the writing Exhjbit 
E was produced and offered in evidence by plaintiffs' 
counsel. 
But counsel, in offering the document Exhibit E, did 
not offer it as a deposition or affidavit of the witness, but 
he professed to offer it in evidence as,-
-"his report made as a result of the order of this 
court heretofore entered appointing him referee"-
and asked that "it be admitted in evidence." But we say, as 
to this, that no matter what counsel might term or name 
the document, if it was being offered in evidence, it was null 
and void along with all the other evidence offered upon no 
pleadings or other defined issues for trial. Because the 
court had no jurisdiction to hear evidence without pleadings 
defining an issue and limiting proofs thereto. See In re 
EvOJnS, 42 Utah 292, 130 Pac. 217, quoted ante page 58. 
If it had been the intention of plaintiffs' counsel to 
present and file the document in question, Exhibit E, not 
as an article of proof supporting some undefined issue in 
the void proceeding, under guise of a trial, but as a referee's 
report made in response to a previous order of court ap-
pointing him referee,-then another set of questions would 
arise. What questions? 
1. Was there any valid order of court ever made and 
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entered authorizing or empowering the referee to act, or 
defining his duties under the order of reference? If not, 
the order and everything done under it was a nullity. No 
use could be made of such a report when returned into 
court and filed. No jurisdiction to appoint a referee,-no 
jurisdiction in the referee to act as referee, to conduct any 
inquiry, or make any report. Hence the report offered and 
filed was not in fact or law what it purported to be, nor 
what it was termed or denominated by counsel. It was not 
the report of a referee. 
2. Should we assume that there was a valid order of 
reference to Mr. Dansie as referee, an assumption which 
the record contradicts, then was there a trial before the 
referee with witnesses produced, sworn and examined, find-
ings made and conclusions of law? We reserve the answer 
to this question to the next division of this brief (post pp. 
76-98). 
3. Were there issues for trial before the referee cre-
ated by any verified pleadings or statements of itemized 
accounts with objections or exceptions pointing out specific 
items as the subjects for proof? Answer no. (ante pp. 59-61.) 
4. Had the referee's so-called report been filed in 
court prior to the opening of this session of court on June 
3, 1942, so as to become the subject for objections. and ex-
ceptions by defendant, and thereby bring to an issue before 
the court any question of law or fact arising upon the ref-
eree's report, for trial when the case would be reached for 
trial upon the hearing of such objections and exceptions? 
The answer is, No, the so-called referee's report was only 
now produced from private custody of plaintiffs' counsel 
and filed, in the midst of a trial undertaken upon no issues 
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whatever. There had been no opportunity at all for defen-
dant's counsel to examine the report, study it, or prepare 
objections or exceptions. In the absence thereof, there could 
be no issues for trial by the court arising upon the bare pro-
duction of the report itself by plaintiffs' counsel, without 
prior inspection thereof by opposing counsel, or objections 
..A. '' v_.: _(,~., 
defining a~'\ trial by the court. 
The bare production and filing of the referee's report, 
such as it was, in the midst of the proceedings, could not 
and did not produce an issue for trial which was lacking 
before. Hence jurisdiction continued lacking and all pro-
ceedings were void. 
This perhaps renders unnecessary any further attention 
to the details of the void proceeding of June 3rd, 1943. But 
at the risk of supBrfluity we point out certain remarks of 
counsel tending to disclose his own point of view with re-
spect to what he was trying to accomplish by his oral evi-
dence in court in connection with this "report of the referee." 
At record page 318 it appears that plaintiffs.' counsel 
called the defendant Newman to the witness s.tand and 
asked him this question : 
"Q. Mr. Newman, have you ever discussed this 
report of the referee with Mr. Dansie?" 
MR. MORRISSEY: I don't know what mater-
iality it has or what he hopes to prove by it. What 
do you want to prove Mr. Callister? Do you want 
to contradict the report? 
MR. CALLISTER: No, I want to go into this re-
port a little further to show that the report is wrong, 
and I feel this is proper. I feel this, your honor, that 
this is a hearing to determine our objections to the 
report. 
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THE COURT: Whether the court will adopt 
the report? 
MR. CALLISTER: That is right. * * * 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
As to this, we point out that the hearing and testimony 
had been going on for quite some time before the court or 
opposing counsel knew that there was any so-called report 
of a referee, and before the paper called a report was pro-
duced and filed. The belated report could not produce an 
issue nunc pro tunc at the beginning of the trial that day. 
And plaintiffs' counsel had not himself filed any objections 
or exceptions to the report either before or since it was 
filed, with a statement of his objections to any particular item 
therein of debits or credits, and so creating an issue for trial 
by the court. We repeat our previous assertion that a party 
cannot go to trial on no issue at all of fact or law, and rely up-
on his proofs or proceedings in court to develop and create an 
issue for trial where there was none before or when the trial 
opened. Ignoring, for the moment, the fact that plaintiffs' 
counsel was in the attitude of both proposing and also in the 
same breath attacking and repudiating as "wrong" a docu-
ment on which he proposed to ask for a sizable judgment 
against his opponent, yet at the same time, he could not create 
any issue at all for trial by the court, without a previous 
pleading of some sort defining the issue to be tried, and serv-
ing the same on the opposing counsel, and giving reasonable 
time for him to prepare for the trial. And this includes any 
objecti.ons to specific items in the report. 
In numerous other ways the plaintiffs sought to weaken 
and impugn the report in question by questions tending to 
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show that it was and is incomplete and therefore inaccurate, 
because of the asserted failure of certain persons to co-op-
erate with and furnish the referee with information of an 
undefined nature the result whereof, if furnished, would 
they contended, have affected the result of the accounting 
as proposed by the referee, because of his inability to get.or 
obtain the desired information. (Rec. 311-319, and nearly 
all the way through.) 
While still pursuing this line of inquiry, the counsel 
asked for an asserted contract between defendant Newman 
and the United States Government in respect to the hospital 
job. Upon inquiry by defendant's counsel what he proposed 
to show by it, Mr. Callister replied in part as follows: 
MR. CALLISTER: * * * Now this court, 
up to this date, has not made any findings of fact, or 
conclusions of law based on the evidence in this case, 
and I feel that the court still has the right to consider 
evidence in respect to this case. * * * 
At the conclusion of the last hearing it was de-
cided necessary to have a referee. Now based on that 
order I find that the referee has only made a report 
as of Sept. 3rd, 1942. This court is not bound by the 
order appointing a referee at that time. We desire 
at this time to offer proof to the effect that * * * 
we should have an accounting for the full 100,000 
cubic yards. 
Here is a distinct statement by counsel that he proposed 
to treat this evidence he was offering in court on June 3rd, 
1943, as a mere continuation of the original two days trial 
that was conducted before the Court on April 5th-6th, 1943, 
and with the doors wide open for the reception of evidence 
that would not be restrained to the issues tried before the 
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Court at that time (namely, that of the existence of a part-
nership or other fiduciary relations between the parties, 
breach of duty, and liability to account), but that his evi-
dence now should include testimony as to matters of account. 
And all as part of one continuous trial upon the original 
pleadings and issues in the case. In other words instead of 
the case being divisible into a trial first on the issues of 
relationship and breach of duty creating a liability to ac-
count, with findings and decree to account as part I of the 
case; and second a trial upon issues framed in the account-
ing itself to present the items of debit and credit on each 
side, to be conducted later by the court or its referee ;-in 
lieu of that method established by this court as required by 
jurisdictional considerations (ante pp. 14-18), counsel now 
proposed to consolidate both into one continuous trial in 
which the trial court should both establish and decree rela-
tionship and duty to account and also take the account itself 
all in one continuous trial. However, counsel did not go so far 
as to want to discard the referee's report entirely. He still 
wanted to hold on to that, and the figures. in the accounting 
therein contained, so long and so far as the same could 
be made serviceable to him. But he wished to cancel and 
impugn so much thereof as he did not like by other evidence 
now to be produced in open court. Or rather, to be more 
accurate, the counsel confessed himself unable to produce 
evidence that would enlarge the amount allowable to plain-
tiffs by the terms of the referee's report. But he believed 
that 'Such evidence existed in the possession of the defen-
dant, or available to him. And counsel proposed to punish 
defendant for not producing these hypothetical figures by 
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taxing against him an amount that counsel believed would 
accrue to his client if defendant Newman could be made to 
"cough up" the information attributed to him by plaintiffs' 
counsel. That is, he wanted a judgment not upon evidence 
but upon his lack of evidence for which lack he held the un-
accommodating defendant responsible. 
But even this did not exhaust the range of counsel's ver-
satility in devising new theories and expedients to justify a 
range of inquiry already run riot for lack of the restraint 
of pleadings and a definite issue. At record page 316 he 
asked Mr. Dansie if in his report he had found for plain-
tiffs in the sum of $13,000, and some odd dollars, and if 
that was not based on the assumption that the joint venture 
ended as of Sept. 3rd, 1942. To which questions Dansie 
answered yes, that is right. And at record page 322 he 
asked defendant Newman if he had not testified several 
weeks ago that he would have nothing more to do with 
plaintiffs on the hospital job, and that he had "kicked them 
off the job." To which Newman replied: "That was Aug. 
11th; they stayed until Sept. 3rd." 
4j..j-L/b 
NOTE: See Newman's testimony ante page -, where he says 
he told Huber and Dunkley they would not be allowed to 
share profits on the hospital job, on the very day he took 
the contract from Col. Thomas; but that they could stay 
on and work at $100 a week wages, if they cared to, other-
wise quit. And that they did remain until Sept. 3rd, 
though Huber didn't do much work after Aug. 11th, he 
was absent making preparations on a new job of his own 
much of the time after Aug. 11th, until Sept. 3rd, when 
he quit entirely; but Dunkley continued at work for New-
man at $100 a week until Sept. 3rd and for 2 or 2 1h weeks 
thereafter. 
"Q. You kicked them off, didn't you? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You wouldn't permit them to continue on 
it, would you? 
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"A. That was August 11th. 
"Q. You kicked them off; after Sept. 3rd didn't 
you tell them you didn't want them on there any 
more? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And you said they were no more partners 
with you? 
"A. I said that Aug. 11th." (Rec. 322, 323.) 
NOTE: Aug. 11th, date of Newman's contract on the hospital 
job he told these parties he didn't want them as profit 
sharers; which means that they never acquired that 
status at the outset, and there was no need to "kick" 
them off thereafter; they were never on. That is, New-
man never breached any contract with plaintiffs to share 
profits because he made none. On and after Aug. 11th he 
only employed them to work for wages which is not 
breached by dismissal at any time with wages paid in full. 
MR. CALLISTER: Now based on that report 
(of the referee) I find that the referee has only made 
a report as of Sept. 3rd, 1942. 
THE COURT: That is as he was ordered. 
MR. CALLISTER : That is correct. Now the 
court is not bound by the order appointing a referee 
at this time. We desire at this time to again offer 
proof to the effect that, based upon Mr. Newman's 
testimony here a few minutes ago that he would not 
permit Mr. Huber to continue in this business, that 
we should have an accounting for the full 100,00{) 
cubic yards. 
NOTE: Does not counsel's statement veer toward a theory 
that plaintiffs are entitled to a share of the profits which 
they might have claimed had defendant Newman seen 
fit to take plaintiffs into a partnership or joint venture 
with him on the hospital job; or else damages measured 
by the profits for his refusal to take them in as partners 
or profit sharers? 
But why, we inquire, did counsel assume or take for 
granted that defendant Newman was obligated in any way 
to take plaintiffs in with him as profit sharers on this hos-
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pital job? He had never at any time proved nor obtained a 
court finding that Newman had bound himself in any way 
to such an undertaking. The testimony we abstracted (ante 
pp. 41-47) leads to the opposite conclusion. If there was any 
conflict of testimony on that subject, it was upon plaintiffs 
to procure a finding of fact by the court which heard all 
the evidence on the subject of partnership relations, or em-
ployer-employee relations, that there was an over-all agree-
ment to enter into and remain in partnership for some 
specified time or duration that would cover all jobs obtained 
by Newman in the meantime. Also that plaintiffs paid some 
eonsideration or made some contribution that would give 
effect to such a promise by Newman. And that the hospital 
job was so obtained during the life of the over-all partner-
ship, hence broken when Newman refused to abide by it in 
excluding them from profit sharing on the hospital job. But 
this theory was annihilated by plaintiff Dunkley's own testi-
mony that each and all of the jobs undertaken was a job-to-
job arangement, each separate and independent of all other 
jobs, and influenced by no over-all agreement embracing 
them all and continued for no time beyond the completion 
()f each job in its turn. (ante p. 26.) 
And again, we repeat, the question here for considera-
tion is not regarding conflicts of testimony, nor antithetic 
contentions of counsel regarding which theory the evidence 
establishes, but the question is, which theory is supported 
by any written findings of fact by the trial court establish-
ing the contract that was actually made by the parties, and 
as to which party breached that contract in a way letting 
him in for an accounting to the opposite party. Until such 
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a finding of fact has been made by the court, fortified by a 
decree to account, the plaintiffs can be in no position to as-
sume, or take for granted, that partnership or joint venture 
is an element in their case with respect to any accounting on 
this hospital job. Or that they can hold defendant to account 
with respect either to the haulage on that job that was com-
pleted on Sept. 3rd, 1942, or the total haulage of 100,000 
cubic yards that was finally completed in January, 1943, 
long after their employment at weekly wages of $100 a week 
had terminated. They had no interest in either the one or 
the other unless so found and decreed by the court on the 
preliminary tria1 in April, 1943. 
This last theory of plaintiffs' counsel, as well as each 
of its predecessors, do violence to the rule established by this 
court (ante p. 14) that in actions of equitable accounting 
the plaintiff must in a preliminary trial prove and get a 
court finding and decree that defendant is a partner and 
liable as such to account, which judgment is final and ap-
pealable, before he can proceed to an actual accounting 
which, when completed, requires another set of findings and 
judgment to determine the amount due. They als.o do violence 
to the additional rule, also established by this court's deci-
sions to the effect that there must be pleadings with defined 
issues limiting the proofs in any judicial inquiry, to support 
the trial court's jurisdiction. So that no matter which theory 
counsel prefers to adopt, regarding the relation of the pro-
ceedings on June 3, 1943, to those on April 5th and 6th, the 
trial court was without jurisdiction to hear testimony or 
make any decision depending on issues in accounting when 
it convened on June. 3, 1943. 
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We have yet to demonstrate, as we will (post pp. 76-98) 
that the referee's report was and is null and void from begin-
ning to end, that it is no more than a batch of unsworn 
written hearsay picked up by the referee from private in-
quiry out of the presence of defendant or his counsel, and 
without legal standing either as evidence or as a referee's 
report to the court. Hence that it can not be looked to either 
as substantive evidence in itself, or to supplement or piece 
out the testimony in open court on June 3, 1943, as a basis 
for determining the state of accounts between the parties 
to this action. And the trial court had no jurisdiction to 
consider either the one or the other, in view that it was pro-
ceeding without jurisdiction to try immaginary or conjec-
tural issues in accounting, without any prior court findings 
of fact and decree to account, nor to review that kind of a 
non-existent record of a non-judicial inquiry, nor substitute 
its own judgment for that of the referee regarding the evi-
dential value of supposed facts gathered by mere inquiry, 
telephoning or chatting with unknown persons. The court 
is forbidden by law to listen to mere gossip in or out of court, 
and so is the referee under the code sections cited infra p. 
78. And the court could not sanction such transgression 
of law by the referee by revising the referee's judgment of 
the evidential value of supposed facts thus gathered. 
On the other hand, there are insufficient figures given 
on the witness stand in the court's session of June 3, 1942, 
(regardless of the absence of any issues in accounting), 
from which the trial court could have constructed a set of 
findings of fact of its own, and from which it could 
possibly have settled a statement of account between the 
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parties, with itemized debits and credits, and a net bal-
ance struck after all expenses of operation were deducted 
from gross earnings. For only the balance could in any 
event be divided. 
The proceedings in open court on June 3rd, 1943, were 
void because in excess of or without jurisdiction, and they 
afford no. support for the findings and judgment of the 
court against defendant for $19,451.03 or any other amount. 
We have been thus meticulous about this matter, bear-
ing in mind, as we do, that this court has held the rule to 
be in actions involving a reference to a referee to take 
evidence and report, that the referee's report (assuming 
it to be a valid report based upon a trial of defined issues 
and upon a lawful and valid order of reference), is ad-
visory only, the same as a jury's verdict would be when 
empannelled to try specific issues in an equity action. And 
that the court may adopt and approve the referee's findings 
or the jury's verdict, or reject it, and make its own findings 
of fact on the evidence adduced before both court and jury. 
(See cases cited infra, pag·e 98.) In line with the rule 
recognized in those cases, if the referee in this case had 
conducted a trial upon testimony of witnesses sworn and 
examined by counsel, and had reported the testimony so 
taken to the court with his own findings and determina-
tion of the issues limiting the proofs, as required by law, 
(assuming a valid order of reference in the first instance), 
in such case the trial court could read through the evidence 
so taken and reported by the referee, place its own judg-
ment thereon, make findings de novo, and disregard those 
of the referee. 
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But in the case at bar, not only has the referee not 
reported back to the court any evidence or testimony taken 
before him, on which the court might substitute its own 
judgment and findings for that of the referee; but, as 
a matter of fact, the referee never conducted a trial, never 
heard any testimony of sworn witnesses in the presence 
of counsel for both parties; never followed any defined 
issues in making his private and off-the-record inquiries, 
or in his tireless pursuit of hearsay unsworn statements 
made by no one knows whom. The trial court could not 
review that kind of non-existent record of non-judicial in-
quiry, nor substitute its own judgment thereon in lieu of 
that of the referee. The court is forbidden by law to listen 
to mere unsworn hearsay in or out of court, and it can-
not sanction such by attempting to revise the referee's 
judgment on the evidential value of such unsworn hearsay. 
On the other hand, there are no sufficient figures in ac-
counting testified in open court upon the witness stand, 
from which could have been constructed a complete set 
of fact findings to the trial court's own liking. And in 
such case this court cannot take upon itself that impossible 
burden as a substitute for the neglect of the trial court to 
attempt it. 
There were neither pleadings defining an issue, nor 
proofs independent of an issue, nor yet findings of fact 
by the trial court upon evidence, to sustain the trial court's 
judgment in this case. The proceedings in court on 
June 3rd, 1943, were absolutely void for lack of pleadings 
and a defined issue to support the same and confer juris-
diction. Coram non judice. 
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THE REFEREE'S REPORT 
(Appendix, post p. 116.) 
However, had there been a lawful order of reference 
appointing Mr. Dansie referee, plus issues to which the 
proofs before him might have been directed, it does not 
appear that Mr. Dansie ever qualified as referee by taking 
the constitutional oath of office. Utah Const. Art. IV, sec. 
10 provides that: 
"All officers made elective or appointive by this 
Constitution, or by the laws made in pursuance here-
of, before entering upon the duties of their respec-
tive offices, shall take and subscribe the following 
oath or affirmation." (Form of oath set out.) 
And Utah Annot. Code, 1943, HM-27-7 :-
"The referee before proceeding to hear any evi-
dence must be s.worn well and truly to hear and de-
termine the facts referred to him and true findings 
render according to the evidence, and he may ad-
minister oaths to witnesses." 
Within our restricted time for preparing this brief 
we have been unable to find any decision by this court 
construing and applying these provisions. In view of the 
restrictive wording of the constitution and statute it would 
seem to have been the intention to prohibit a referee going 
into office or performing any function thereof until he has 
taken the prescribed oath. Under section 104-2.7-6 a referee 
is clothed with all the dignity, functions and powers of the 
court. We question whether Mr. Dansie was ever in office 
as referee, and if not, all his acts as such were void. 
But, if he were ever in office, then all his acts and 
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doings were void because of the form and manner in which 
he attempted to perform his duties. Not that any possible 
manner of performance could validate a void appointment 
and order of reference,-nor a reference made in the ab-
sence of the indispensible prior decree to account creating 
and imposing upon one party to the action the duty or 
liability to account to the other party. But what did Mr. 
Dansie do, upon the assumption that he was lawfully in 
office? 
And first, what should a referee do upon receiving a 
va.Zid order of reference based upon a valid decree to 
account? First, he should look to his jurisdiction by ex-
amining the record to see whether there were pleadings 
defining an issue to be tried; i. e., an itemized account, 
objections to items thereof, a counter-account. If not, 
then look to the order of reference to see if he is authorized 
to call upon the parties to so plead and define the issues to 
be tried. If not, he should decline to act, and make return 
accordingly on the order of reference to the court, or else 
himself compel the parties to plead and produce an issue 
for trial. 
Assuming that proper issues are produced, affording 
a basis for a trial, what should he then do? Code section 
104-27-6 governs the procedure of a referee. It requires that 
the referee must make an order fixing a time and place 
for the trial before him to begin, and give each party ten 
days' notice thereof. Then he must proceed to hear the 
evidence of the parties within the issues, just as the court 
itself would do if it had not appointed a referee. That is, 
he must hear the testimony of witnesses upon direct and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78 
cross-examination. He is governed by the same rules of 
evidence that govern the court in its reception of evidence 
(Code sec. 104-54-5). He may issue subpoenas to require 
witnesses to come before him and testify during his trial 
of the case. At the conclusion of the trial he must make 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law, just as 
the court must do in trying a case. (Code sec. 104-27-6.) 
And a bill of exceptions may be presented to, signed, settled 
and filed by him, the same as the court may do if trying 
the case. (Code sec. 104-39-8.) 
Did the referee in this case, Mr. Dansie, do any of 
these things? No. There were no issues of fact created 
by any pleading or itemized statement of account filed 
with the court or before the referee, or by any objections 
thereto. He did not fix a time or place for trial, nor notify 
the parties to attend. No witness testified under oath 
before him ; no direct or cross-examination ; no evidence 
was received by the referee in the presence of the parties 
or their counsel. No rules of evidence were observed by 
the referee in gathering his information. He gave the 
parties no day in court so as to bind them by evidence 
received or his rulings thereon. He proceeded exparte from 
beginning to end. He gathered his evidence by private 
inquiry orally or over the telephone, and out of the presence 
of either of the parties, for the most part. He received and 
treated as evidence books, records and documents gotten 
somehow from somewhere, but not authenticated by the 
oath of any witness as to the proper keeping thereof, or 
the correctness of the contents thereof, or the entries 
therein. In all that he did he betrayed no consciousness of 
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his duties under the law, nor that he was expected to sit 
judicially as a court and hear testimony under oath in the 
presence of parties on both sides of the case. 
If the referee did none of these things, then what did 
he do? From the contents of his report, and his own 
testimony in court in support thereof, upon his getting the 
order of reference, he proceeded to-
-"an examination of existing books, documents 
and papers submitted by the parties to this suit, and 
has made considerable independent investigation to 
establish facts not shown by such records." (Page 
1 of his report filed Aug. 27, 1943.) 
Whose books, and of what parties to the suit? He does 
not name the parties who produced the books, nor indicate 
the nature, contents or import thereof. Books of account, 
no more than other private writings, do not prove them-
selves by their mere production. They require the authenti-
cating oath of the persons who made the entries or kept 
the books that they were correctly kept in the course of 
duty, etc. Otherwise they are mere written hearsay. 
This rule was recognized by this Court in the case of 
Eureka Mining Co. v. Bullion Beck & Champion Mining 
Co., 32 Utah 236; 90 Pac. 157, citing Healey v. WeUesley 
& C. Ry. Co., 176 Mass. 440, 57 N. E. 703. 
And where did the referee get his authority to consider 
as evidence on the trial of what unknown issues, and out 
of the presence of the parties or their counsel, the-
-"considerable independent investigation toes-
tablish facts not shown by such records."? 
The referee's report then proceeds to list a number 
of schedules of receipts and disbursements, under different 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
80 
headings, designated Exhibits A, B and C, and Schedules 
1 to 17 inclusive, attached to his report, and treats the 
contents thereof as established facts for the purposes of 
his report to the court. But where did he get his informa-
tion to construct those exhibits and schedules, in the ab-
sence of any judicial trial by him in the presence of both 
parties or their counsel? He does not say that he · got 
the information from sworn testimony of witnesses, but 
says he made considerable independent investigation to 
establish facts not shown by the records. What facts did he 
thus establish, and how do we know they were facts at all? 
The parties are not bound by his private inquiry from 
unsworn witness out of their presence and hearing. 
His statement of the contents of accounts as constructed 
in Exhibits A, B and C, are based upon hearsay testimony 
and are binding upon no one. (Pages 1-3.) 
On page 3, paragraph 3, his report states that: 
"While it is recognized there may be expendi-
tures related to the jobs in question which are not 
reflected in this report, such omission, if it exists, 
is due to a lack of any record or evidence of such ex-
penditure coming to the attention of the referee." 
Here is an admission that his report of expenditures 
and disbursements, properly allowable, may be incomplete, 
therefore unjust. But had the referee proceeded lawfully 
to conduct a trial of appropriate issues of fact, after notice 
to both parties of the time and place fixed for trial, and 
in their presence, with the opportunity to both sides to 
present witnesses, then the referee need not have concerned 
himself with whether there were additional expenses pro-
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perly chargeable in account or not. The burden of produc-
ing witnesses being upon the parties concerned, a failure 
or inability to prove all disbursements would be the bad 
luck of the parties affected thereby. And his findings of 
fact would bind and conclude the parties. Proceeding 
privately, other than by a public trial, the statements of 
account cooked up by the referee binds no one. It is hearsay 
from beginning to end. 
vVhen we designate Mr. Dansie as referee herein, it 
will be understood to be out of courtesy and as if he had 
been lawfully appointed and qualified. 
These remarks apply also to the two items of $147.00 
and $466.00 mentioned at the bottom of page 3 of his report. 
The referee's disposition of those items binds no one. 
On page 4 of his report the referee states that costs 
on the jobs at Wendover do not lend themselves to easy 
segregation and hence have been treated as a unit. The 
"jobs at Wendover" refer to the three jobs at issue under 
the complaint, viz.: The Harrison-Dorman job, the Hos-
pital job and Railroad job. And no wonder they do not 
lend themselves to easy segregation. They are the jobs in 
respect of which the amended third defense and counter-
claim charges the plaintiffs with recreancy in failing to 
keep separate accounts to the detriment and injury of de-
fendant, and downright misappropriation of part of his 
$13,000.00 entrusted to plaintiffs to meet pay rolls. The 
referee states that it would take considerable additional 
time to try to make the segregation and unwarranted addi-
tional expense. We contend that plaintiffs were bound to 
make the segregation and they could not discharge the 
burden by getting such a report as this from the referee. 
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The referee, on page 4 of his report, next takes up 
the consideration of the "Hospital Job". This was one of 
the jobs mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint and amended 
complaint as the subject of the alleged partnership and of 
the accounting they sought. It is also one of the subjects 
of the defendant's recrimination in his third defense and 
counter-claim. Although no finding of fact had been made 
by the court, and no decree to account, with respect to that 
job or any other, yet it was included in the void order of 
reference, and the referee got into operation with respect 
to that job and others. On page 4 of his report the referee 
begins his mention of this job as included within schedule 
7 of his report. He there states that the report (meaning 
the information on which schedule 7 was constructed)-
-"was received from Lt. Col. G. A. Howarth, 
area engineer for the U. S. Government at Wendover, 
upon request of the undersigned made through Mr. 
Newman. 
"In another letter from Col. Howarth, advice is 
given that the total yardage of the hospital job, ex-
clusive of miscellaneous work done under that con-
tract number, is 72,676.05 cubic yards. The hospital 
job is reported as officially completed under date of 
September 30, 1942. 
"Request has been made of Mr. Newman's office 
to furnish information from the U. S. area engineer, 
and from their own records, giving details as to the 
placement of the yardage represented by the differ-
ence between 59,492 yards and 72,676.05 yards. Up 
to the date of the preparation of this report the ad-
ditional information has not been received." 
We here interrupt the quotation to point out that the 
quoted statements disclose that the referee was engaged in 
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the illegal and unauthorized course of assembling his in-
formation on which to base a report to the court by means 
of private inquiry from unsworn witnesses, by correspond-
ence with other unsworn persons, and by unwarranted 
inferences drawn from his failure to get complete coopera-
tion from other persons, instead of conducting a public 
trial in the presence of counsel for both sides. In such 
a trial the responsibility for assembling their witnesses 
and producing complete and adequate proofs would have 
been upon counsel for the respective parties, aided by 
subpoenas if necessary. And in case of their inability to 
obtain complete proofs, the misfortune would fall upon 
themselves, not upon the referee. And the decision of the 
referee upon all the evidence produced would have been 
binding on both sides, and equally so whether the proofs 
were lacking as where they were ample and abundant. 
The report of the referee based upon private inquiry out of 
the presence of the parties serves to show not only its 
illegality but its unserviceability as a report because of 
its incompleteness and its reliance upon unsworn state-
ments obtained out of the presence of the parties. 
Returning now to quote from the report (bottom of 
page 4) it recites : 
"There is a difference of opinion between the 
parties involved in this case as to the price per cubic 
yard at which the revenue from the hospital job 
should be computed." 
Why did not the referee decide this difference of opinion 
upon a vital point in his report to the court. The price per 
cubic yard was an indispensible factor in the accounting 
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process (if lawfully undertaken and executed). If the ref"-
eree had conducted a public trial instead of a private parley, 
he would have had judicial authority to settle the dispute 
by listening to sworn testimony on the subject and by mak-
ing a finding of fact thereon. His failure to do so condemns 
his method of disposing of the issue by non-judicial inquiry. 
But his report proceeds to say : 
"The original contract called for 100,000 cubic 
yards at a price of 59 cents per yard. Under date of 
Sept. 6, 1942, a change order relating to this con-
tract was initiated, and final approval was given in 
December, 1942, changing the terms of the contract 
to 100,000 cubic yards at a price of 69 cents. The 
change order in itself does not give any particular 
explanation for the change made. 
"Without presuming to express any opinion as 
to the legal implications of the change order in ques-
tion, the undersigned has used a price of 69' cents 
upon the assumption the change order relates to the 
contract as a whole." 
Again we inquire, how did the referee know that the 
contract on this hospital job between defendant Newman 
and the U. S. Army Engineers. called for 100,000 cubic 
yards at a price of 59 cents per yard. Assuming that he 
saw some sort of a paper specifying those terms, did the 
document prove itself, its authenticity, its signature by ade-
quate authority and by defendant ?-without the sworn 
testimony of any witness authenticating the same? And the 
same criticism applies to the so-called change order. Who 
issued it, and by what authority. And by what authority did 
the referee accept the change order raising the price ten 
cents a yard, as operating to the advantage of the plaintiffs 
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in this action by crediting them therewith in the accounting 
he was trying to make? 
Doubt is cast upon this matter also by the fact that the 
order appointing the referee (Rec. p. 74-76) contained a 
provision limiting the authority of the referee to inquire 
into the hospital job "only as to Sept. 3, 1942" (Rec. p. 75, 
5th line from bottom), and not beyond that date. 
But the referee not only presumed without authority 
to go beyond that date in his inquiry, but avoided "presuming 
to express any opinion as to the legal implications" of what 
he found out by such transgression of authority, viz.: the 
legal implications of the change order. If he had been try-
ing the case judicially as a referee of the court as code 104-
27-6 intends, and had he been guided by the ordinary rules 
of evidence in a court trial, as code 104-54-5 intends, he need 
not have felt it to be a presumption on his part to express 
his opinion on the subject by means of a finding of fact and 
a conclusion of law, that would have bound and concluded 
both parties, save on review by the court. As it is, the de-
fendant is not bound by the referee's unauthorized presump-
tion, his neglect to presume, or by his giving the plaintiffs 
the benefit of the doubt in his own mind arising from no legal 
evidence, and to the extent of an unauthorized debit against 
Mr. Newman of ten cents a yard on 72,676.05 cubic yards, or 
$7,267.60. 
Returning to the referee's report, on page 5 thereof, 
mention is made of an unsettled balance claimed by one 
R. M. Birdzell of Wendover, Utah, for sand, gravel and fill-
dirt hauled by him on the Harrison and Dorman job. This 
job is also one of the three mentioned in the pleadings on 
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both sides as the subject of an attempted accounting by each 
against the other. Concerning this item the report recites 
that: 
"Investigation concerning this claim has de-
veloped the fact that a controversy exists with re-
spect to whether or not this amount is owing by 
Newman, Huber and Dunkley. Due to the fact that 
the amount has never been paid and that there is a 
difference of opinion as to whether or not it is due, 
no effect has been given to same in this report. If it 
develops that such amount, or any portion of it, is 
owing then it should be charged one-third to Newman 
and two-thirds to Huber and Dunkley to maintain 
the proper relationship of the parties as set forth in 
this report." 
The same objections lie to this part of the referee's re-
port as to tbise before discussed. Assuming the referee had 
lawful authority to make any investigati~n at all of the 
accounts, which the record contradicts'; yet in order to prop-
erly discharge the duties of a referee under the code, he 
would have to conduct a public trial upon sworn testimony 
in open court in the presence of opposing counsel. Had he 
done that, it would have been his duty to decide the contro-
versy between the parties before him as to whether the 
Birdzell item was owing and chargeable in account or not. 
The fact that a controversy existed disclosed that one side 
(most likely Newman) was contending it to be a just claim, 
at least in part; while the plaintiffs Dunkley and Huber 
were disputing it. The same fact made it the duty of the 
referee to decide the controversy, instead of passing it up, 
and to include it, so far as allowed, in the accounting he was 
proposing to make. If such a decision required Birdzell to 
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be brought before the court as a party, that might be done 
under equitable procedure by a petition naming Birdzell 
as a defendant, requiring him to plead and set up his claim. 
But again the referee gave plaintiffs the benefit of the 
doubt remaining from an undecided controversy, and re-
jected the Birdzell claim entirely. The result is, if Birdzell 
should elect to sue Newman (sole sub-contractor in the 
Harrison-Dorman contract and the only party recognized 
by Harrison-Dorman or by R. M. Birdzell), who is amply 
solvent and able to respond; and should he get judgment and 
it be paid by Newman, then he might try his luck in trying 
to collect back two-thirds of it from Huber and Dunkley 
who, it appears by this record, have had only one truck apiece 
employed in all these jobs, and that one truck each would 
be exempt. 
We need hardly pause to cite law to the point that, 
assuming there was a partnership between plaintiffs and 
defendant on this Harrison-Dorman job, and so found by 
the court, and an accounting thereof decreed, so as to bring 
the question before the referee, it would be his duty to see 
that all claims of creditors of the firm were brought in, their 
claims allowed or rejected, and a balance struck, before pro-
ceeding to a proposed division of the net assets. 
"The interest of a partner in the firm assets is 
the share to which he is entitled under the part-
nership agreement, after claims against the firm 
are satisfied and the equities and accounts as be-
tween the parties adjusted, and has been so defined 
in a number of statutes." 
47 Corp. Jur., p. 780, Partnership, sec. 221, note 
99, citing cases in foot note from nearly all 
.the states; 
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Utah Annot. Code, 69-l-351 t;)-1-!- :·! · 
"As otherwise stated, the rule is that partners 
do not, as individuals, own the firm property, but 
that it is held by and belongs to the partnership, as 
such, subject to the right of the partners to have it 
applied to the payment of firm debts. * * * The 
interest has been said to be a mere chose in action." 
47 Corp. Jur., p. 781, sec. 221, notes 3 and 6 et 
cit., and see 47 Corp. Jur., p. 911, sec. 401. 
The referee's report proposed to ignore this rule of law 
and, as appears later, the trial court ratified it and gave 
judgment accordingly. 
There is a further item, closing the referee's report, 
beginning at the bottom of page 5 of his report, which re-
cites that: 
"The final matter relates to information given 
by Mr. Bradshaw Harrison of the firm of Harrison 
and Dorman. Mr. Harrison stated to the undersigned 
that under date of April 28, 1943, his firm had made 
a demand upon Victor Newman for the payment of 
$7,579.64 in connection with their contract with 
N ewma.n. It was explained that this amount repre-
sented a settlement with Curtis Sand and Gravel 
Company of the excess cost in having Curtis com-
plete Newman's. contract with 'them. 
"No effect has been given to this item in this 
report, and if this amount, or any part of it, is de-
termined to be due to Harrison and Dorman, it should 
be charged one-third to Newman and two-thirds to 
Huber and Dunkley." 
What we have just said regarding the R. M. Birdzell 
item applies in full force to the disposition made by the ref-
eree of this balance claimed by the Harrison-Dorman Com-
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pany. If it is a just claim it should have been brought into 
the calculation of accounts between Huber and Dunkley on 
the one hand and Nev.:man on the other. And that would be 
on the assun1ption that the district court had, in the first 
instance, in its trial of that issue, both found and decreed 
that a partnership exists between these parties, and ordered 
Newman to account to Huber and Dunkley. Otherwise, there 
was no jurisdiction to take an account or refer the matter 
at all. Ho,vever, could all this be gotten around, then the 
referee should have conducted a judicial trial of issues 
formed by adequate accounts filed, with objections thereto, 
pointing out the items in dispute. Without any such issue 
formed by verified accounts or other pleadings defining 
issues, the referee proceeded to a private inquiry. And 
when confronted by a dispute, he passed it up, and gave the 
benefit of contested items to the plaintiffs. If the Harrison-
norman claim for $7,579.64 for excess cost of having the 
Newman undertaking completed by the Curtis Sand & 
Gravel Company, is a valid one, it is just as much a firm 
liability as was the R. M. Birdzell claim of $2,632.45. Dunk-
ley and Huber, assuming they sucessfully maintain their 
claim to a two-thirds interest in this Harrison-Dorman 
job as partners of Newman, would have to await payment 
and satisfaction of both claims against their firm, before 
asking division and distribution of the cash balance of 
firrp assets. The referee declined to pass upon it as valid 
or not, but bunched the two claims together and allowed 
the plaintiffs two-thirds of the whole, ($10,212.49) which 
is $6,808.06 as a present in his accounting, without deciding 
their right to it. 
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The Referee's Testimony 
We have now finished with the recitals in the referee's 
report, and we take up his testimony on the witness stand, 
y;jp__(..-~/ 
to further elucidate it. ~ the report was filed, the case 
was brought on for another hearing before the court. 
Whereupon Mr. Dansie was requested to take the stand, 
and he was interrogated by plaintiffs' counsel. The chief 
purpose of this questioning seems to have been to lay a 
foundation for impeaching the referee's report, insofar as 
it made an allowance of $41,049.48 receipts from the Hos-
pital job based upon a yardage haul of 59,492 cubic yards 
between August 11th and September 3rd, 1942. (See 
Schedule 7, record page 463 of the report.) 
We pause here to say that it is not the writer's inten-
tion to go extensively into the figures arrived at by the 
referee in the schedules of his report. That would only 
be appropriate if we had here a valid referee's report, 
rather than a complete nullity based upon hearsay obtained 
by private inquiry, without issues, legal evidence, or find-
ings thereon as required by law. But in order to point an 
inquiry subsequently arising before the court, we do digress 
here long enough to notice one circumstance relating to 
the figures accepted by the referee, in connection with his 
testimony. 
His report stated (pages 4-5) that the original con-
tract on this job was for 100,000 cubic yards at 59 cents 
a cubic yeard (referring to Newman's contract with the 
U.S. Army Engineers.) He based this on a letter of May 7, 
1943, from Col. Howarth (marked Exhibit F in the exhibit 
envelope), stating that only 59,492 cubic yards had been 
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hauled up to September 3, 1942 (when plaintiffs right, if 
any, ended, according to the trial court's rulings and order 
of reference). 
Now 59,492 cubic yards at 59 cents yields only $35,-
100.28. But the referee, in schedule 7 of his report, upped 
this amount to $41,049.48, or a difference of $5,949.20, by 
adding ten cents to the contract price of 59 cents per yard. 
Why? Because he had gotten sight of a change order 
(unproved) raising the contract price to 69 cents per yard, 
dated September 6, 1942. That is, the referee just assumed 
that this "change order" had an ex post facto operation; 
and so he carried it back and applied it to the haulage 
already delivered before the change order was made and 
before September 3, 1942. And this although it was made 
to appear elsewhere in the record that the change order 
was not approved by the army authorities until December, 
1942 (Rec. p. 378). Thereby the referee added two-thirds 
of this $5,949.20 raise, or $3,955.27 to plaintiffs' "take," 
otherwise proposed in his report. 
But plaintiffs' counsel was not satisfied with this velvet. 
He wanted also a slice out of defendant's haulage on this 
Hospital job after September 3, 1942, which was after they 
had ceased to have any interest in it (assuming that they 
ever had an interest), by their own testimony, and by the 
trial court rulings prior to the reference, also incorporated 
in the order of reference. To implement his efforts in this 
respect, he at once began to term the letter of Col. Howarth 
(exhibit F in exhibit envelope) hearsay (Rec. 312). And 
he followed this up from time to time until he finally got 
the trial court to rule that it was hearsay, and to exclude 
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it as such (Rec. pp. 347, 391-2), although that letter was 
one of the props on which the referee's report rested, which 
report plaintiffs' counsel had procured to be made, vouched 
for it, and offered it in evidence (Rec. p. 316-7). And as 
if the referee's report itself were not made up of hearsay 
from beginning to end. That is, hearsay because its verity 
rested on what sundry persons had told the referee, not 
under oath, but out of the presence of the parties and their 
counsel. 
We refrain from further comment here on the pursuit 
by plaintiffs' counsel of additional perquisites from the 
Hospital job to which his industry would lead us. It may 
recur later in connection with the trial court's rulings and 
findings. For the present we stick to the referee's report 
and the manner of its preparation as disclosed by the 
referee's own testimony. The fact that he constantly pur-
sued the plan of private inquiry from unsworn persons 
out of the presence of defendant and his counsel, is dis-
closed on nearly every page of his testimony. (See Rec. pp. 
311-7, 330-7, 345, 351-2, 376-380, 384-390.) Further, his 
testimony shows that he ran around the streets and to 
different places in company with plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. 
Callister, making these private inquiries, out of the pres-
ence of defendant or his counsel, showing that Mr. Callister 
condoned and participated in this method of making a 
judicial inquiry. (Rec. pp. 330, 335, 351, 384.) Both 
Mr. Callister and Mr. Dansie openly admitted this in open 
court session. (Rec. pp. 330, 335, 351, 384.) 
As regards the books and records that Mr. Dansie 
"audited" and condensed their unsworn contents into his 
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report, it is doubtful upon his testimony in open court 
whether in fact he ever saw any of the defendant Newman's 
books and records, that were kept and the entries therein 
made by Newman's authority. There was an effort made 
by his questioner to convey the impression that he had 
seen Mr. Newman's books. But his later statements throw 
doubt upon it, and the books spoken of may have been and 
likely were, only the self-serving compilations of the plain-
tiffs themselves. It must be noted that the plaintiff Dunk-
ley, in testifying sought to convey the impression that the 
books he kept were kept for the partnership claimed to 
consist of himself, Huber and Newman. And Newman 
claimed that the records that Dunkley kept at Wendover as 
his employee, were all mixed up and confused, and that no 
accounting had been made to him by Dunkley. Hence New-
man may never have received or seen these books or records, 
or loose memoranda, whatever they were. They were cer-
tainly no part of Newman's regular books of account kept 
for him by his own regular bookkeeper, Mr. William Bacon. 
With this background of conditions in mind, we may be 
better able to appraise some of the questions thrown at 
Mr. Dansie by plaintiff's counsel on this subject. 
"Q. Now, Mr. Dansie, there was submitted to 
you, was there not, all the books and records of the 
enterprise known as Huber and Dunkley and New-
man enterprises on ·the Hospital Job, Ft. Douglas 
Job and various other jobs as submitted in that order 
of court appointing you, were they not? 
"A. As far as I know." 
"Q. You asked for their books, did you not? 
"A. Yes sir." 
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Now who was it that submitted these undescribet 
books to the referee, claimed by the questioner to be tht 
books of the enterprises in question? The witness himse}j 
had no authority or privilege in law to draw his own con. 
elusions as to whose books they were, who had kept them, 
or whether they belonged to an enterprise owned by Huber, 
Dunkley and Newman. That would be for the court or 
referee when authentic sworn testimony should be pro-
duced. If they were submitted to Mr. Dansie by Dunkley or 
Huber only, it can not be said that Newman was bound to 
any admission as to the verity of the contents thereof of 
whatever nature, or that he vouched for their accuracy. 
Aside from that, how could Mr. Dansie have known whether 
the books shown him were all the books and records or not. 
Furthermore they were affected by the considerations next 
below mentioned. 
At record page 349, Dunkley while on the witness 
stand produced a book containing a record which he claimed 
to have made and kept as timekeeper on this hospital job 
from its beginning on August 11, 1942, until September 3, 
1942, when he ceased to keep it. This, and other books or 
papers in his own possession, but so far as appears never 
seen by Newman, may have been the books of the enter-
prises in question to which the questions of counsel above 
quoted referred. But the record and Dunkley's own testi-
mony show that he had even then begun to claim adversely 
to his principal's rights and interests, claiming to be a 
partner, a claim then unknown to Newman. In view of 
which no book entries that he could make or devise could 
be used as evidence in his own favor against his principal. 
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From the moment a fiduciary sets up an interest or claim 
adversely to his correlate, his representative character is 
destroyed, and nothing that he can do, or say, or write in 
a book in his own favor or interest can bind his principal, 
or correlate. 
This applies also to another book mentioned by Dunkley 
at record page 353, as kept by himself on the railroad job, 
but the contents of which he gives no information. Re-
turning now to the questions asked by counsel, viz. : 
"Q. Now Mr. Dansie, you have had delivered to 
you all the books, records and documents pertaining 
to the Wendover job of the Huber-Dunkley-Newman 
enterprise, have you not? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And you have examined those books, docu-
ments and papers? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Have you 'been able to ascertain from those 
books, documents and papers any expenditures on the 
Wendover job after Sept. 3rd, 1942? 
"A. There were some expenditures made after 
that, which are included in my report, relating to the 
work done prior to Sept. 4th. 
* * * * 
"Q. Did you find in those papers, books and 
records any expenditures on the hospital fill job, sub-
sequent to Sept. 4th, 1942? 
"A. No, sir." (Rec. p. 388.) 
Bearing in mind that the trial court had on April 6th 
trial in this case ruled from the bench (see ante pp. 51-52) 
that the supposed joint venture had come to an end on 
September 3, 1942, it is easy enough to see that the books 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
96 
referred to above were those constructed by Dunkley, either 
before or after he left Newman's service. As such they 
naturally would not contain any record of Newman's ex-
penditures on the job after Dunkley ceased to keep the 
records for Newman. After Newman took over on Sep-
temper 4th he saw to it that adequate records were kept 
by his own loyal employees and bookkeepers, not by one 
who had already become his adversary in thought, act and 
intent. Although Dunkley remained on the job in some 
capacity for two or two and a half weeks after September 
3rd, 1942, his duties with respect to the keeping of books 
or records on the hospital job must have ceased at that 
time. This, not only as a natural inference from Dansie's 
finding no entries in the books Dunkley kept, later than 
September 3, 1942, but also from the testimony of New-
man regarding the messed up, mixed up, conditions of the 
Dunkley books and records on the jobs and his great dis-
satisfaction therewith (ante pp. 41-44). See also the charges 
made in this respect in Newman's counter-claims in this 
case (Appendix post pp.125-7, 129-130). So that the failure of 
the Dunkley books, kept by him before he was "fired" as 
bookkeeper or timekeeper on the job, to show expenditures 
by Newman thereafter would not be at all surprising, and 
proves nothing as to what was in fact done by Newman 
thereafter on the hospital job. The questions and answers 
quoted are only noteworthy for the subtle way in which 
it was sought to confuse and mislead. It certainly cannot 
be said therefrom that Mr. Dansie ever saw any of Mr. 
Newman's own books and records that were kept by his 
own loyal employees, faithful to his interests, or by which 
he would be in any way bound or concluded. 
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If :Mr. Dansie had asked Newman for his own books and 
records on this job from and after September 3rd, 1942, to 
supplement those kept by Dunkley, and if Newman stood 
upon his rights, he never would have opened any of them 
to aid Dansie in the sort of unjudicial, private, one-sided 
and unsworn investigation he was engaged in conducting. 
And it is fairly inferable that that is just what Newman 
did refuse to do, in view of the constant complaint running 
all through the questioning of Mr. Dansie upon the witness 
stand and the answers evoked thereby, that Mr. Newman 
or his representatives refused to give certain information 
asked for by the referee; that the latter's repeated requests 
remained uncomplied with ; so that he had to close his report 
without benefit of the information they might have given 
him. See Record pages 314-5, 345-6, 352. Had Mr. Dansie 
pursued the statutory method of conducting a public trial 
of issues framed to delimit the proofs, in the presence of 
both parties and their counsel, Mr. Newman might have 
been found more cooperative. 
In all the reported cases heretofore reaching this court 
involving a reference to take testimony and report, the 
published opinions of this court show that the referee 
followed the statute, conducted a public trial with witnesses 
sworn and testifying openly in the presence of the parties 
and their counsel ; that the evidence was preserved by the 
referee and reported back to the court with his own written 
findings of fact, conclusions and recommendations for a 
decree. That thereafter the parties filed with the trial 
court such objections and exceptions as they desired, hear-
ing was had thereon, and the court ruled thereon and 
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either adopted or modified or rejected the referee's fin( 
ings and settled its own findings accordingly. Why woul 
that not have been a good way for this referee to hav 
followed? We cite: 
Hanks v. Matthews, 8 Utah 181, 30 Pac. 504; 
Hanson, In re, 48 Utah 163, 158 P.ac. 778; 
Eureka Mining Co. v. Bullion Beck, etc. M~"n. Co. 
32 Utah 236, 90 Pac .. 157; 
Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, etc. Co., 14 Utah 339 
47 Pac. 311; 
Reev·er v. White, 8 Utah 188, 30 Pac. 685. 
The referee's report was utterly void and binds no one 
In historic phrase it was "a mere scrap of paper." 11 
cannot serve to enlighten the court either as evidence o1 
a testifying witness or as an official return of the referee 
to the court's void order of reference. It is addressed as 
a private letter to the trial judge, thus: "Dear Sir," etc. 
Besides, the court was itself acting without jurisdic· 
tion in the absence of written pleadings and a defined issue 
limiting proofs; that is, it was conducting no lawful trial, 
was authorized to make no judicial inquiry; and not even 
sworn testimony on the witness stand could rescue the pro-
ceedings from utter invalidity and illegality. Certainly the 
private letter from the referee could not. 
Let us now see what the trial court did attempt to do 
about it. 
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THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 
In all that we have said hereinbefore, we have taken 
the position that the trial court never did make any findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, or decree establishing the exist-
ence of a partnership relation between plaintiffs and defen-
dant, a breach of duty by defendant growing out of that 
relationship, and a liability to account therefor, nor decree 
that defendant proceed to account, before it proceeded to the 
accounting itself; that is, to a determination of the items 
of debits and credits that would, when properly itemized, 
classified and tabulated, show a net balance that belonged 
to the parties, and the proportionate share thereof belong-
ing to each party. That position is still true, as we approach 
the conclusion of the trial and of this brief. The trial court 
proceeded to an accounting between the parties, in irregular 
fashion, without first finding as facts, drawing conclusions, 
and decreeing that defendant owed the plaintiffs any duty to 
account. And it decreed a state of affairs to exist, (without 
evidential support) from which it drew the conclusion that 
defendant ought to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $19,451.03, 
and entered a decree accordingly. Thus exceeding its juris-
diction, under the decision of this Court in the Rozelle case 
(ante p. 14). 
Now it does not heal this jurisdictional deficit for the 
trial court to have inserted in its findings of fact which 
consummated the attempted accounting without jurisdiction, 
certain provisions purporting to determine relationship 
between the parties which would have been appropriate in 
a preliminary trial and decision of those matters with de-
cree to correspond, prior to undertaking the accounting 
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process. In this final decree in accounting which the com 
did enter, or just prior thereto, the trial court did make som 
findings of fact, incomplete and insufficient, but still find 
ings that bear a certain resemblance or comparison to find 
ings of fact the court might have made at the close of th 
preliminary trial April 6th, 1943. They were filed too lat1 
to afford any support to the accounting that was attempte1 
on June 3rd-4th, 1943. Appropriate findings at the firs1 
trial must have preceded the final trial to give any validit~ 
to the latter. And defendant had the right to test the validi~ 
and sufficiency of the former by an appeal to the SupremE 
Court before being forced into an accounting against hh 
will. It was .too late to acquire jurisdiction after the non· 
jurisdictional trial had been completed. 
Perhaps we might dismiss this matter of the finding~ 
that were belatedly made on this subject of relationship of 
the parties and liability to account, with the foregoing re-
marks. But should opposing counsel by any ingenuity of 
strategy seek to build a case thereon, we might point out 
some of its deficiencies to meet the issues in the pleadings1 
notwithstanding they were late and unprofitable in any 
event. 
Part of paragraph 1 of these findings (Rec. 83-84; post 
pp. 130-140) were responsive to the averments in paragraphs 
1, 2 and 4 of the amended complaint (Rec. 13-14, appendix 
post pp. 116-7), but not completely so. It was not responsive 
but repugnant to the evidence on the same subject. It contra-
dicted the plaintiff Dunkley's own testimony that there was 
no general and over-all agreement for a partnership cover-
ing all jobs taken in the intermountain area, as alleged; but 
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that there were separate agreements or undertakings upon 
each job in turn, as it came up, embracing only that job and 
no other (ante p. 26). This was decisive, because in the 
absence of any such general and over-all agreement embrac-
ing and comprising all jobs taken within its operation, and 
still in existence when the three jobs in the pleadings came 
up and were undertaken, there was no basis whatever for 
the contention insistently made and pressed by plaintiffs 
counsel, that the defendant breached this general and over-all 
agreement of partnership or joint ventures by excluding 
plaintiffs from the benefit thereof in respect of, for instance, 
the hospital job. When that job came up, if Newman did 
not see fit to take plaintiffs in on it with himself, either as 
profit sharers, or in any other way, that was his privilege. 
Assuming, of course that he had not bound himself by any 
obligation to do so, based upon a quid pro quo or considera-
tion paid, from which he could not withdraw himself. And 
plaintiff Dunkley swears that he and they did not. All the 
service they did for Newman after August 11th was under 
defendant's offer to let them remain, if they chose, at $100 a 
week. And that was terminated when they ceased to work 
and went away,-Huber on September 1st, or thereabouts, 
and Dunkley about two weeks later. 
Newman testified that he gave plaintiffs notice on the 
very day he took the contract on the hospital job from the 
U.S. Army engineers, that they were not to share profits on 
that job (ante pp. 41-44). We find no contradiction of this in 
the record anywhere. But if there were a conflict of evidence 
on the point, it enters directly into the question of joint 
relations on the job, and plaintiffs who contend for it should 
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have procured a court finding of fact to settle the question: 
before coveting an accounting or sharing of the profits. 
They cannot go on getting $100 a week as wages, then turn 
and claim a share of the profits in addition. 
Pararaph 1 of the court's belated findings is, deficient 
in this respect, in that it contains no statement of duration 
of the claimed joint ventures agreement, if any, or that it 
was in force and bound the defendant at the time he accepted 
the jobs in dispute here. The Harrison-Dorman job only 
and alone could be said to have been a joint job when taken 
(not by any general over-all agreement but by special agree-
ment when that job was taken); and that job lost money, 
under the· undisputed evidence, and so Newman owed them 
nothing on that job. 
With respect to the belated finding paragraph 1, in its 
relation to the issues in the pleadings, there were averments 
in the counterclaims that plaintiffs were defendant's trusted 
employees performing personal services for him for a com-
pensation or reward in respect of these jobs. And there was 
evidence to sustain these averments, the agreed compensation 
or reward being a share of the net profits in lieu of a stated 
salary. This constituted employee relationship notwithstand-
ing the profit sharing provision (see ante p. 28). This 
certainly called for a s.pecific finding of fact whenever the 
cour-t felt an impulse to make findings in the case. The 
findings made were too late to do any good, but if and when 
made, should be complete and meet every issue in the plead-
ings, both affirmative and negative (ante p. 19). 
The finding, within paragraph 1 thereof, that plaintiffs 
and defendant entered into a.· joint venture on the Stearns-
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togers job, Harrison-Dorman job, Geer job, Fort Douglas 
ob, Railroad job and Hospital job and accepted and did the 
vork on all these jobs under a.n oral agreement comprising 
hem all, is absolutely unsupported by any evidence in the 
·ecord or by any witness for either side, but is contrary 
;hereto (ante p. 26). Plaintiff Dunkley himself disputes 
t specifically, while Huber never testified at all. Not even 
;he complaint claims that the Stearns-Rogers job, the Geer 
iob, or the ·Fort Douglas job were embraced within the 
Llleged partnership agreement (Appendix post pp. 116-9). 
Going now, away from the amended complaint and 
;he issues made thereon, we find numerous affirmative 
1verments of material facts, in the defendant's amended 
mswer and counterclaim (Rec. pp. 51, 59; Appendix post 
)p. 120-131), calling for findings of fact in respons'e to each 
ssue tendered. Upon the decisions of these issues by the 
~ourt would turn its decision as to whether plaintiffs owed 
;he defendant the duty of accounting, in the first instance, 
:or a violation of their duties as trusted employees, handling 
md disbursing his funds to the amount of $13,000, or there-
lbouts, deposited to their credit in a bank .to permit them 
;o meet his pay rolls during his absence upon other jobs. 
:\nd their alleged violation of the duty to be loyal to his 
.nterests, that is, undertake no jobs on the side in their own 
1ame and interest while financing their payroll out of de-
:endant's funds deposited in trust in their bank account, yet 
~ollecting the proceeds for their own use, and making no 
tccounting thereof to defendant. And their alleged violation 
>f their duty to be competent and able to perform the duties 
~hich they undertook to perform on several jobs which lost 
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money to defendant because of their neglect, misconduct an( 
dereliction of duty. And their duty to be faithful in thl 
keeping and rendering of their accounts to defendant upor 
each of his jobs separately, on which they were employed 
and their failure so to do, to his great loss and damage 
There was evidence upon which specific findings of fac1 
could have been made by the trial court on each issue sep-
arately as contained and alleged in these several pages and 
paragraphs of the amended answer and counterclaims. For 
the issues governed the question of whether the plaintiffs 
had breached their duties to the defendant in these several 
respects and particulars, upon the decision of which by the 
court, by apt findings responsive to the issues, it should 
have ordered the plaintiffs. to account to the defendant, 
before becoming entitled to an accounting from him in any 
event. These were material and indispensible issues; and 
it was the court's duty to make specific findings upon each 
issue and to enter a dcree to account in conformity thereto. 
But it should have done this two months prior, and before 
it occupied its time with any accounting. 
The trial court did not make any such findings either 
at the conclusion of the preliminary trial in April, 1942, nor 
in its set of belated findings made after the attempted 
accounting in excess of jurisdiction. 
Going now to paragraph 2 of the belated findings of 
fact (Rec. p. 84, post p. 140) it states that the referee her~ 
tofore has made his report and accounting, which the court 
has adopted in part and modified in part. We have shown 
herein that the referee's report was such in name only, 
and not one in fact or law. The Court also finds that there 
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was a joint venture in respect of the hospital job as of, to, 
and including September 3rd, 1942. This is unsupported by 
evidence \Vhich shows that no joint venture on this job was 
ever undertaken by defendant with plaintiffs in the first 
instance, but explicit notice to the contrary was given by 
defendant to plaintiffs on the very day the contract for that 
job was obtained (ante pp. 41-44). But if there was any basis 
for a contrary finding, it should have been made and filed 
by the trial court in April, 1943, and before the accounting 
process was entered upon. 
Finding 3 is a mere conclusion of law upon unstated 
facts and amounts to nothing. 
Paragraph 4 of the findings is unsupported by evidence, 
in that Plaintiff Dunkley testified that there was no general 
agreement for any duration covering all jobs; that their 
arrangements began and terminated with each job separately 
and never comprehended more than one job, as each job 
in its turn arose and was finished (ante p. 26). Anyway 
it is belated and void. 
Paragraph 5 states that Dansie was appointed referee 
and has made his report which the court adopts, in which 
receipts and disbursements are listed, and which are copied 
literally from the report into the court's findings. There 
.are several pages of these figures listed as Exhibit A, Ex-
hibit Band Exhibit C in the report and in the finding. The 
balance struck against defendant Newman in favor of plain-
tiffs Huber and Dunkley by Exhibits B and C thereof, is 
$13,386.37. (See appendix post pp. 143-6.) In adopting the 
report the court adopted a nullity and the finding gained 
naught thereby. 
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A further feature of Exhibits A, B and C of the report, 
carried into the finding, is that of the bunching of the ac-
counts on the Harrison-Dorman job, the Geer job, the rail-
road job and the hospital job into one consolidated statement 
of account. The receipts on these jobs are listed as separate 
items and added up, but the disbursements are mixed to-
gether indiscriminately, so that no one can tell how much 
was disbursed on each job separately. As the referee was 
dependent on the information, books and payrolls kept by 
the plaintiffs, which the referee found in great confusion, 
it is understandable how they could not be separated by an 
expert accountant. The referee reports that "these jobs do 
not lend themselves to easy segregation" and so he "treats 
them as a unit." No wonder. That is why they got into 
hot water with Newman and he fired them when he could 
stand it no longer. See complaints in his counter-claims. 
Furthermore, there was no legal excuse for his going into 
the Geer job or the Stearns-Rogers job, for they were not 
embraced in either the complaint or counter-claims. Howbeit, 
if they had been so included and the reference lawfully 
made and conducted, it would have been to the defendant's 
advantage, because plaintiffs got away with a lot of defen-
dant's money to meet the pay rolls on both those jobs, and 
kept the income therefrom without an accounting. 
But the trouble with all this "crap" in the referee's 
report is that it is purely hearsay, not built upon sworn 
testimony or authentic books of record; from material as-
sembled somehow by private inquiry and exparte cooperation 
with plaintiffs' attorney out of the presence or knowledge 
of the defendant, and none of it has any value whatever 
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as evidence or otherwise, on which the court below could 
lawfully act. It had no right to take any notice thereof. Its 
finding based thereon falls to the ground like an empty sack, 
for it has nothing to support it. And to cap it all, the court 
was proceeding without jurisdiction and not even valid 
sworn testimony could avail it anything. Coram non judice 
can properly be written across every page of the court's 
proceedings on June 3rd and 4th, 1943. 
Paragraph 6 of the findings can be summarily disposed 
of in the same way, wherein it is recited that 72,676.05 
cubic feet of material was delivered on the hospital job 
under defendant Newman's contract with the government. 
The only support for this is Mr. Dansie's void report coupled 
with two letters from the U. S. Army Engineers marked 
Exhibit F (see exhibit envelope), which plaintiffs counsel 
objected to and caused to be excluded by the court as 
hearsay. Thereby kicking the only props from under the 
report which plaintiffs had offered in evidence as Exhibit 
F (Rec. p. 316) ,-assuming that one hearsay document 
can support another or give evidential value to either of 
them. 
We have considered this feature to some extent in our 
discussion of the Dansie report itself (ante pp. 62-67, 76-98), 
and need not repeat. Plaintiffs' counsel strove vainly to sup-
plement these void documents on the witness stand, and the 
proceedings in the bill of exceptions from record page 310 
onward is the story of his flounderings. No witness could 
be produced to substitute for the excluded hearsay letters 
of Col. Howarth (Exhibit F). At length, in apparent 
desperation, counsel put his client Dunkley back on the 
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witness stand again, after frequent trips before) and in 
answer to questions Mr. Dunkley stated: 
"I acted as bookkeeper on the hospital fill job. 
I kept a day-by-day record of the cubic yards put on 
that fill. From Aug. 11th, which was the first day 
dirt was hauled up there to Aug. 25th there was no 
actual yardage record kept because when the job 
started Mr. Howe, the resident engineer, gave Mr. 
Huber and myself the impression that they were 
going to measure it by barrow-pit measurement. 
Therefore no load tickets were given out on the actual 
yardage hauled there. (Witness thereupon gives the 
daily number of loads between those dates, which 
foot up a total of 7,326, loads.) (Rec. 339.) 
"I haven't any yardage on the loads that were 
hauled down to Aug. 25th. Each load did not have 
the same amount in it. Every truck hauling may be 
different or may be the s'ame. Up to Aug. 25th there 
were no trucks that were measured even. They were 
working by the hour and they hauled what was put in 
them. (Rec. 343-4.) 
"From Aug. 25th to Sept. 3rd the truck loads 
were measured and load tickets given, and my record 
is made from the tickets turned in by the truck driv-
ers, and are correct. (Witness gives the daily haul-
age in cubic yards from Aug. 25th to Sept. 3rd from 
his book recrd, which foots. up a total of 26,77 4 cubic 
yards.) (Rec. p. 340.) 
"The figures given in Exhibit F (viz.: the letter 
of Col. Howarth to Newman) can only be an estimate, 
because no tickets were given out on the cubic yard 
basis. They commenced to measure the pit starting 
Aug. 25th. (Rec. 341.) 
"MR. CALLISTER: This letter (Howarth's 
letter Exhibit F) in my judgment is pure hearsay, 
and I am going to introduce it for that purpose. Mr. 
Newman is the only one who can get the informa-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
109 
tion from Col. Howarth. And I would ask, if they 
don't believe Mr. Dunkley here, let us have Col. 
Howarth, or let Mr. Newman bring in the evidence 
to show that we are wrong. Mr. Dansie asked for 
that information and it hasn't been forthcoming. 
(Rec. 344.) 
"MR. MORRISSEY: If it is possible to sub-
poena the man who sent us that letter we will bring 
him down. (Rec. 345.) 
"MR. CALLISTER: We will take Mr. How-
art or anybody that will give us the figures. I can't 
get them. (Rec. 346.) 
"THE COURT: I don't think there is any ques-
tion about it this letter is hearsay. If your witness 
is the only witness there is here I am very apt to 
believe your witness. If there is any other evidence 
they produce that I think better I might believe that. 
But unless there is, I wouldn't worry so much. 
"MR. CALLISTER: Thank you. 
"Q. Will you please total up the amount of 
cubic yards as shown by your records you have 
testified to, from Aug. 11th to Sept. 3rd inclusive, 
as to the amount of cubic yards that was hauled 
which was hauled on this job? 
"A. They are not totalled up in this book and 
naturally I can't add them up. But I incorporated 
in this book-at least I don't see it anywhere,-the 
total yardage that was hauled from Aug. 11th, to 
Sept. 3rd,-all of those figures add up to 71,000 
cubic yards." (Rec. 347.) 
NOTE: Comparing the last statement <;>f ~h~ witne~s in this 
(luotation with these that preceded It, It IS mamfest that 
he has no book record of the yardage hauled from Aug. 
11th to 25th 1942, on the hospital job; else he would 
not have ma'de the statements he did taken from Rec. 
pp. 339 to 343. His neglect to keep the y~rdage reco:d, 
thereby throwing his employer's accounts mto confusiOn 
with the Government's army engineers, was one of t~e 
causes of his being discharged by Newman from his 
employment at $100 a week which plaintiffs had ac-
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cepted at the beginning of the hospital job. See ante 
pp. 41-46. 
Even should we give full credit to this lame attempt 
at the last moment to patch up a set of figures on the 
witness stand footing 71,000 cubic yards (to approximate 
the 72,676.05 contained in the excluded letter Exhibit F of 
Col. Howarth, the army engineer) , and let it go at that. 
Still plaintiffs would have no supplement or substitute for 
the void Dansie report, in respect of disbursements,. and 
net amount of profits subject to division with plaintiffs in 
accounting. It is only net profits of a joint enterprise after 
all operating expenses and liabilities are paid that can be 
divided. Assuming the plaintiffs were joint adventurers 
on the hospital job, as claimed, still the burden was upon 
them to show, in an accounting, how much the net profits 
are, and how much defendant Newman owed them. And 
do it by legal evidence at that, not by hearsay. 
The 72,676.05 cubic yards hauled on this job (see ex-
hibit F, 2nd letter) the plaintiffs counsel was trying to 
approximate by this witness as having been hauled before 
September 3rd, 1942, were really the result of much con-
tinued hauling by Newman's trucks after that date. See 
his testimony abstracted ante page 46 of this brief. His 
hauling on the job did not end until January 21, 1943. 
There is another fatal defect of proofs to support para-
graph 6 of the findings (post p. 146) in addition to those 
already pointed out. And that is, the computation of sixty-
nine cents per cubic yard on 72,676.05, cubic yards (instead 
of Dunkley's approximately 71,000 cubic yards testified 
above). The contract was originally taken by Newman for 
59 cents a cubic yard (ante p. 41). Mr. Dansie in his 
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skirmishes about town professed to have found that after 
the contract was let on August lOth or 11th, 1942, and 
that after defendant Newman had hauled 59,492 cubic yards 
between that date and September 3rd, 1942, the Government 
army engineers had made a "change order" raising the 
price per cubic yard to be paid on this job from fifty-nine 
cents to sixty-nine cents per cubic yard. With respect to 
this feature the report stated (post pp. 136-7) that: 
"Under date of Sept. 6, 1942, a change order 
relating to this contract was initiated, and final ap-
proval was given in December, 1942, changing the 
terms of the contract to 100,00 cubic yards at a 
price of 69 cents. The change order in itself does 
not offer any particular explanation for the change 
made. Without presuming to express any opinion 
as to the legal implications of the change order in 
question, the undersigned has used a price of 69; 
cents upon the assumption the change order relates 
to the contract as a whole." 
But what authority of law did Mr. Dansie have to 
assume anything to the advantage of the plaintiffs and to 
the detriment of the defendant in his professed attempt 
to strike a just account between them? There is no direct 
evidence in the record that the change order was to cover 
the entire haulage of 72,676.05 cubic yards hauled to the 
hospital fill area (including the 59,492: cubic yards hauled 
before September 3rd, 1942). It may or may not have. 
Whether it did or not, the consideration for the increased 
price must, in sound reason, have been some additional 
valuable service or benefit to the government, or of detri-
ment to Newman, that would influence such an allowance 
of ten cents additional per cubic yard to that which the 
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Government had bound itself to pay in the first instance. 
And if so, the ten cents extra would inure to Newman, not 
to plaintiffs who had contributed nothing toward earning 
this increase of allowance. Their work on the job had been 
done on the basis of $100 per week wages; and they quit 
even that employment before this increase of 10 cents a yard 
was allowed or even earned by Newman. But we are not 
without some direct light on the subject. There was a cer-
tain document in writing bearing on this subject of ·the 
change order, and the reason for it, that was read into this 
record by the trial judge himself, wherein it is stated that 
the additional ten cents was allowed to Newman to compen-
sate him for a longer haul that was required by the Govern-
ment engineers to get material preferred to that which 
Newman had been hauling under the contract prior to Sep-
tember 6, 1942, when the change order was initiated (Rec. 
pp. 402-3). 
And to follow this up, the defendant's attorney at the 
trial made a tender and offer of proof by witnesses to go 
upon the witness stand and testify to the same effect, viz: 
a longer haul costing Newman more money to perform his 
contract. But the offer of proof was refused and denied 
by the court, and exception taken (Rec. pp. 307-400). Now, an 
offer of available proof of a proposition is the full legal 
equivalent of the actual proof, when refused by the court. 
Proof cannot be rejected and at the same time hold that 
the offerer's case is deficient for the lack of it, and a find-
ing made contrary thereto. 
Paragraph 8 of the findings is wrong for the same rea-
sons as paragraph 7. Defendant can have no objection to 
any deduction or reduction from this unjust and unlawful 
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udgment. But there is no evidence to support a judgment 
:or one amount or another. We know of no authority of 
aw for a trial court to make a conditional finding as to any 
Lmount found due and owing, or to exact an indemnity bond 
:rom a defendant as a condition of not making the amount 
arger or smaller. The power to exact a bond is statutory, 
:ts in cases of attachment, replevin, receivership, injunction 
md the like, as a condition for relief which a party may not 
lemand as of right before trial on the merits. The power 
does not exist without a statute. No law authorizes the court 
:o exact a bond in connection with its final judgment in a 
~ase like this. This provision in the finding is null and void. 
rhe court should have required liquidation of the Birdzell 
:tnd Harrison-Dorman claims by action at law if necessary 
:>efore proceeding to distribute in any event. ~-·,._. 
ttzw:iak edt .itu P 1 Us ;i~ftlh·N;;uiitci;~~-- · !Bevec;o 
iiJ•t•·• ;-·JDnt _ altt?'S' a tu t1 . ll:e•MIIi ... 
ur~ t - *1 I Ue ·sea ltll'Ca !" lh 
The Court should make a specific and unconditional 
[inding that a definite amount is due, or that nothing at all 
ls due. It cannot find in one amount if the losing party 
[urnish security to the favored party, or a higher amount 
!f he fail to give security. 
If Huber and Dunkley are partners or joint venturers 
with Newman the court should have so found and decreed 
:>efore ever going into an accounting. Then such a question 
:ts this would not have arisen. 
The utmost complexity is introduced by the provisions 
:or bond and counter-bond between the parties. Any dif-
:erences or contention between the parties as to the phrase-
>logy of the bonds would throw the whole matter into con-
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fusion with each party accusing the other and probabl, 
unenforcibility. The whole procedure is unknown to cod 
practice. 
The conclusions of law, depending on the findings ar1 
responsive to none of them, and do not follow as a lawfu 
conclusion. 
THE FINAL DECREE 
The judgment for $19,451.03 is not responsive to thE 
findings, and in addition is beset with the same maladie! 
that afflict the findings. That is, it rests on hearsay testi· 
mony, and a document called a referee's report, which call 
not stand or function as such in this case. 
The judgment is also void because it is unconditional 
for $19,451.03, but conditional as to execution for part of 
it, whereas the finding of fact is for $19,431.03 conditional 
upon certain bonds being executed by each party to the 
other. If plaintiffs failed to furnish their bond first for 
$7000, defendant was not obligated to file his bond for 
$3300. No bond has been filed by either party. Yet an 
unconditional judgment for $19,451.03 was entered im-
mediately without waiting for any bonds to be filed as 
directed by the findings. 
Part of the total $19,451.03 in the amount of $6,808.06 
is the proportionate share of certain obligations which 
plaintiffs ought to pay, if their contentions can be main-
tained that they were partners, and they have no right to 
be secured in respect thereof by Newman, on penalty of 
a judgment against him in that increased amount if he 
fails to give such security. 
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IN CONCLU.SION, let it be said that the preparation 
of this brief has been a rush job, due to the writer's late 
employment in the case, some weeks or a month or more 
after the appeal was taken. It had to be completed within 
scant time in order to get it printed and filed in this court 
within extended time therefor, rather than trust to chances 
for getting a further extension. With time, the brief might 
have been condensed, a more orderly arrangement perfected, 
and some additional questions dealt with for which there 
is now insufficient time. For this we crave the patient 
indulgence of the court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant Newman. 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
E. J. HUBER and RALPH DUNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VICTOR NEWMAN, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
(Rec. 13-16) 
Plaintiffs complain of defendant and for cause of action 
allege: 
1. That on or about the fore part of April, 1942, the 
plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral agreement 
in which they agreed to enter into the contracting business 
and accept bids for certain work to be done in the intermoun-
tain area. That pursuant to said oral agreement the plain-
tiffs and defendant accepted contracts on certain jobs in 
the intermountain area and completed the same and divided 
their profits on the basis of one-third each. 
2. That ever since the fore part of April, 1942, these 
plaintiffs and defendant have carried on and now continue 
to carry on said business and have at the present time three 
uncompleted jobs which were undertaken by these plaintiffs 
and this defendant jointly; these jobs being termed by the 
parties as the railroad job, hospital job and Harrison-Dor-
man job, all in the County of Tooele, State of Utah. 
3. That these plaintiffs have at all times and in all 
things duly conformed to their understandings and done 
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their part in all respects in accordance with said understand-
ings. 
4. That there was no definite term agreed upon be-
tween the parties as to the termination of said partnership. 
That it is the desire of these plaintiffs to terminate this 
partnership immediately. That the said defendant has wil-
fully and persistently breached the understanding agree-
ment between the parties. That he refuses to account for 
moneys received on what is termed the "hospital job." That 
he continually makes statements that he will not permit 
these plaintiffs to participate in their share of the profits 
which will be received on the hospital job. That the said 
defendant is so conducting himself in matters relating to the 
partnership business that it is not reasonably practical to 
carry on the business in said partnership with him. 
5. That the defendant has excluded the plaintiffs from 
participation in the jobs herein enumerated; he further re-
fuses to advise them the amounts he is collecting and what 
he is doing with the money. That this defendant is co-mingl-
ing funds collected on the jobs herein set forth in his per-
sonal account in the First National Bank at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which is used in the disbursements of moneys on all 
of the jobs of the Newman Construction Company. These 
plaintiffs allege that there have been profits obtained from 
these jobs which moneys the defendant has appropriated 
to his own use, the exact amount of said moneys these plain-
tiffs allege is unknown for the reason that the defendant 
refuses to account to these plaintiffs for any moneys re-
ceived or to advise them of the amounts and the costs of 
doing the jobs. This defendant has made statements that 
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he was going to purchase a shovel out of the profits of the 
hospital job in the amount of $8,000. That he has purchased 
the shovel and these plaintiffs allege that moneys derived 
from the hospital job have been used for the purchase of 
said shovel. That said shovel is being used on other jobs of 
this defendant. That these plaintiffs have advanced moneys 
to pay workmen on the hospital job in the sum of $2,000. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this defendant has received 
in excess of $35,000 on the hospital job, he refuses to ac-
count to these plaintiffs for any moneys, but uses the same 
as he sees fit without any consultation with these plaintiffs, 
and refuses these plaintiffs the right to help decide how 
and what way the moneys derived from the hospital job 
shall be disbursed and to what creditors and in what amounts. 
These plaintiffs have been deprived by the defendant of 
their rights to participate in the management of the affairs 
of the partnership; that the defendant has so many jobs 
that he has neglected and is neglecting the jobs set forth 
herein which is a substantial loss to these plaintiffs. That 
the defendant is taking all moneys received from these jobs, 
appropriating the same to his own use as he sees fit to dis-
burse it and refusing to tell these plaintiffs how much he 
has received and what he has done with it. The moneys of 
the partnership are in grave danger of being lost, the same 
being removed from the possession and custody of the part-
nership, being put into the personal possession of the defen-
dant. That the shovel purchased from moneys received from 
the hospital job has been moved from the premises and is 
being materially injured because of its constant use day and 
night on other jobs by the defendant and without reim~urse-
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tent or accounting to these plaintiffs. That by reason of 
x:cluding these plaintiffs from participating and assisting 
1 the finishing of the jobs set forth herein, the funds of 
he partnership will substantially be depleted. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment as follows: 
1. That the partnership now existing between plain-
[ffs and defendant be dissolved, that an account may be 
aken of each and all the said co-partnership dealings and 
ransactions from the time of the commencement thereof; 
md also an account of the moneys received and paid by the 
>laintiffs and defendant, respectively, in regard thereto; 
he plaintiffs being now ready and willing and to hereby 
•ffer to account for the partnership dealings and transac-
:ions which have been carried on by these plaintiffs; and 
hat the defendant may be decreed to pay to the plaintiffs 
~hat, upon the taking of said accounts, shall appear to be 
.ue them. 
2. That a receiver be appointed with full power and 
mthority to collect and receive all moneys and debts now 
lue or to become due to the said partnership, or to the plain-
iffs and defendant, or either of them, as partners; to pay 
ll debts of the partnership now due or to become due; to 
1anage and conduct the business of the said partnership 
a the future, for the joint benefit of the plaintiffs and 
:efendant; and to do all other matters necessary and proper 
o such conduct and management; to sell the property and 
ffects of said partnership and to make a distribution of 
he profits of the said partnership to the plaintiffs and 
efendant according to the interest which they have therein. 
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3. For cost of suit, and for such further and othE 
relief as the nature of the case may require. 
{Verified) 
Filed Oct. 29, 1942. 
.[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
L. W. CALLISTER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff~ 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
(Rec. 51-59) 
The defendant above named for his amended answe1 
and amended counter-claim to plaintiffs' amended complain1 
herein, says : 
For his FIRST DEFENSE thereto that the amendec 
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action. 
For his SECOND DEFENSE the defendant specifically 
denies that on or about the forepart of April, 1942, or at 
any time, the plaintiffs and defendant entered into an ora] 
agreement in which they agreed to enter into the contract-
ing business and accept bids on certain work to be done in 
the intermountain area. Denies that pursuant to said. ora1 
agreement the plaintiffs and defendant accepted contracts 
on certain jobs in the intermountain area and completed the 
same and divided their profits on the basis of one-third 
each. Denies that ever since the forepart of April, 1942, 
these plaintiffs and defendant have carried on and now 
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carry on said business. Denies that at the present time, 
or at the time the amended or original complaint herein 
was filed, plaintiffs and defendant had three uncompleted 
jobs which had been undertaken by these plaintiffs and de-
fendant jointly. Admits that plaintiffs and defendant had 
transactions with reference to or concerning three certain 
construction jobs known and referred to as the railroad job, 
hospital job, and Harrison-Dorman job all in Tooele County, 
State of Utah, but denies that said jobs were taken or trans-
actions had under or pursuant to any partnership or joint 
agreement or undertaking as alleged, or otherwise than as 
alleged in defendant's third defense and counter-claim here-
in. Defendant denies each and every allegation in the 
amended complaint contained not hereinbefore specifically 
admitted or denied. 
For his THIRD DEFENSE and COUNTER-CLAIM 
against the plaintiffs defendant alleges: 
1. That this defendant is, and for a long time past, 
has been engaged in the construction business, specifically 
in the business of grading, hauling, moving and disposal of 
large quantities of earth, gravel and rock, in preparation for 
the construction and erection of important public works, 
mostly incident to and required by the defense activities of 
the United States Government and its several agencies, 
subordinates and corporate instrumentalities and function-
aries. Defendant is a large and effective operator in his said 
field or branch of construction work, is possessed of large 
quantities of machinery, trucks, tools and equipment which 
he owns, uses and employs in said construction work, and 
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employs for hire the owners of other trucks and equipment 
to aid therein, and by his recognized energy, judgment and 
ability in the said field of construction work has earned and 
holds the confidence and esteem of the employing agencies 
and instrumentalities of the United States Government, both 
civil and military. So that his services have been and are 
much in demand for the performance of such construction 
jobs where ability, dispatch and economy of operation are 
required in the public interest. As a consequence he is, and 
for some time past, has been entrusted with contracts for 
large construction works, each such contract separate and 
apart from all others, but running in whole or in part con-
currently with other contracts, and each involving the handl-
ing and disbursement of large sums of money and the as-
sumption of heavy responsibilities, by the contra.cting par-
ties. Said jobs required constant effective supervision, skill 
and management to see that all operatives and equipment 
are continually employed to the best economy and effect. 
That because said jobs are usually separated and at a dis-
tance from each other, this defendant has been and is unable 
to be constantly in attendance upon each of his said con-
tract jobs, and he is obliged therefore to employ competent 
persons of requisite skill, judgment and energy to supervise 
and oversee work on several jobs and contracts in his inter-
est and in his place. 
2. That accordingly on or about the several dates and 
times next hereinafter mentioned defendant was awarded 
and entered into contracts by and with each of the. several 
contracting parties to be named, and each requiring defen-
dant to do large construction work in the grading, hauling, 
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rock, and each requiring a specified rate of progress and 
time for completion, under penalty of forfeiture, and defen-
dant gave bond to each with security for performance there-
of, to wit: 
On or about July 25th, 1942, this defendant contracted 
with the Harrison-Dorman Company, a corporate operative 
under contract for larger construction work, for work to be 
done at or near Wendover in Tooele County, Utah. 
On or about the lOth day of August, 1942, this defen-
dant contracted with the United States Government for 
the doing of certain other construction work at or near 
Wendover in Tooele, Utah. 
On or about the 15th day of August, 1942, this defen-
dant contracted in writing with the Western Pacific Rail-
road Company, a corporation for the doing of certain other 
construction work at or near Wendover in Tooele County, 
Utah. 
3. That at or about the time of the commencement 
of his work on said Harrison-Dorman Job, and because de-
fendant could not by reason of his other contracts and com-
mitments be always personally present thereon, defendant 
employed the plaintiffs for a reward or compensation to 
perform his duties of management and to supervise the 
work, operatives and management of the operatives, per-
sonnel and equipment employed thereon, in defendant's place 
and for his use and benefit; to receive and faithfully ac-
count for and disburse any moneys entrusted to them in 
said employment, or deposited in bank to their credit for 
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said purposes; to keep true accounts, books of record, pay 
rolls and vouchers in detail. And when the additional jobs 
above mentioned, known as the railroad job and the Hos-
pital job were undertaken by defendant as aforesaid, the 
employment and duties of the plaintiffs were by like agree-
ment and for a compensation or reward, extended to and 
made applicable by further agreement with defendant in 
respect thereto. In addition thereto, the plaintiff Huber by 
special agreement with defendant undertook for a compen-
sation to keep said accounts, pay rolls, books and records on 
each of said jobs separate and apart from the others. 
4. The plaintiffs accepted said employment and entered 
upon the performance thereof. In accepting said employ-
ment the plaintiffs well knew and understood the nature 
and requirements thereof as aforesaid, and they agreed and 
undertook to faithfully perform the same, to be loyal to 
their employer and his interests, to seek no separate or self-
ish interest or profit therefrom save their agreed compensa-
tion as aforesaid, and to at all times make full and true dis-
closure of all matters affecting his interests and keep naught 
secret from him in respect thereto. 
5. In the course of operations under said contracts 
this defendant caused his own personal checks to be issued 
in payment to the various employees, operatives and per-
sonnel employed thereon. But in order to supplement the 
same and to enable plaintiffs to meet and defray certain 
urgencies as they arose, this defendant also. deposited in 
bank to the credit of the plaintiffs in cash, large sums 
of money, in the total sum of more than $13,000 upon which 
they could, and did from time to time, draw checks-not 
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all of which were to meet and pay urgencies or other neces-
sities of their said employment, but also for their private 
and unauthorized uses and purposes, or for unexplained dis-
bursements for which they have made no account to defen-
dant, but have been kept secret from him. That the plain-
tiffs have been fully paid for their services, or if aught re-
mains, the same is exceeded by funds and property of defen-
dant for which they are accountable to him, and for which 
they have not accounted. 
6. That the plaintiffs in the course of their said em-
ployment failed to keep true, accurate and complete books 
of account and records showing all their receipts and dis-
bursements upon said three jobs, and failed to keep the ac-
counts and disbursements on each job separate and distinct 
from the others, but combined and commingled the same so 
that the same cannot be separated or distinguished, and so 
that the status of defendant's operations and accounts on 
each job cannot be determined, nor yet the status of ac-
counts as between defendant and the plaintiffs upon all 
or either of said jobs separately. Thereby they have pre-
vented and made impossible any true, just or complete ac-
counting of their transactions in said employment. Like-
wise, by their amended complaint herein they claim to have 
commingled their own private cash funds with the funds of· 
this defendant entrusted to their care, or in the bank account 
in which defendant's funds were deposited for his use and 
benefit. That by said wrongful acts the plaintiffs have pre-
vented and made impossible such accounting as they pretend 
to seek by their amended complaint herein. 
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7. That in order to make an attempted accounting by 
defendant with his employing patrons under said contracts, 
defendant has been and will be required to incur and pay 
large expense to employ and pay expert accountants to audit 
and settle the same, and to make an attempted reconciliation 
thereof, so far as possible to satisfy his said patrons and 
obtain a settlement with them of work done upon said three 
jobs. 
8. Likewise, because the plaintiffs failed to exercise 
the measure of care, prudence, energy and effective super-
vision over the employees, operative personnel and equip-
ment on said jobs, to secure the requisite rate of progress 
thereon with economy, the rate of progress on said jobs fell 
below the requirements of said contracts, exposing defen-
dant to deductions, penalties, and forfeitures, so that profits 
were prevented or greatly diminished-the extent whereof 
is confused and uncertain because of said failure and de-
faults in accounting hereinbefore alleged. The said Harri-
son-Dorman job was cancelled and withdrawn from defen-
dant under the provisions thereof, so that defendant can 
expect only a partial settlement thereunder, and either 
diminished profits or direct losses thereunder. 
9. That because of the misconduct and defaults of the 
plaintiffs hereinbefore alleged, when the same came to de-
fendant's knowledge, the defendant did on or about the 15th 
day of September, 1942, discharge and remove the plain-
tiffs from their employment, and demanded that they return 
to defendant all books, records, vouchers, and other docu-
ments, data and information in their possession concerning 
said jobs, and an accounting of and repayment of all of 
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defendant's funds entrusted to them, not properly disbursed; 
but the plaintiffs have hitherto failed and refused to com-
ply with said demand, except in small and inadequate part. 
From one or more of the account books, containing inade-
quate and insufficient accounts, there appears to have been 
removed and abstracted certain leaves before delivering the 
same, thereby withholding full information and further 
preventing a true accounting of matters affecting plaintiffs' 
adversely. 
10. Defendant denies the averments of partnership as 
contained in plaintiffs' amended complaint; denies that any 
accounting is due from defendant to plaintiffs: alleges on 
the contrary that there is due from plaintiffs to defendant 
an accounting of plaintiffs' acts and doings aforesaid, while 
serving in the capacity of trust and confidence on said con-
struction jobs; that the cost of proper and necessary audits 
be charged in account against them; and that upon a final 
accounting defendant have judgment against plaintiffs for 
the balance found to be due him in the premises, be the 
same $5,000 or more or less than said sum. 
11. Alleges that the construction jobs herein mentioned 
are the identical jobs and transactions sought to be com-
plained about in the plaintiffs' complaint, but says that the 
same were no partnership transactions. 
WHEREFORE, defendant demands the judgment of the 
court that the plaintiffs be ordered and decreed to account 
to the defendant for and concerning the moneys, property 
and contract interests of the defendant so committed to their 
custody and control. That upon the taking and settling of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
128 
said account, the defendant have judgment against them 
for the amount found to be due, be the same more or less 
than the sum of $5,000, and for his costs herein incurred. 
For a FOURTH DEFENSE and COUNTE&-CLAIM de-
fendant alleges : 
1. He refers to, and by reference makes part hereof 
paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and makes the aver-
ments thereof applicable to the contract job and transaction 
next herein alleged, except that he omits allusion to the 
three contract jobs in paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, mentioned, 
and he omits any reference to or averment of the deposit of 
funds by defendant with plaintiffs or to their credit in bank, 
as contained in paragraph 5 thereof. 
2. That on or about the 1st day of July, 1942, this de-
fendant contracted in writing with the Jacobson-Construc-
tion Company, a corporation, for the doing of certain con-
struction work at or near the Fort Douglas Military Reser-
vation in Salt Lake County, Utah, requiring the grading, 
moving and disposal of a large quantity of earth, gravel 
and rock, and defendant gave bond with security for the 
performance thereof. 
3. That at or about the time when work was begun on 
said Fort Douglas job, or soon thereafter, this defendant em-
ployed the plaintiffs for a compensation or reward to per-
form personal services in the nature of supervision and man-
agement thereof, and of the operatives, personnel and equip. 
ment employed thereon. That said e·mployment was one of 
trust and confidence, involving the care, custody and control 
of trucks and other operating equipment of large value, the 
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supervision and direction of personnel and equipment; to 
;eek no selfish profit or advantage; the keeping and render-
lng of faithful accounts of their operations thereunder; and 
the plaintiffs held themselves out as possessing the requi-
site skill, judgment and ability to perform the same. 
4. That during the course of performance of the con-
struction work under said contract, and before the same was 
near completion, the plaintiffs, in violation of their duty and 
obligation of loyalty to defendant, of exerting themselves in 
his interest alone and to seek no private profit or benefit 
beyond their agreed compensation, and in violation of their 
duty to keep accurate and complete accounts of their doings, 
and to serve him only in their capacity of trusted agents, 
managers and supervisors of the work on said job, in the 
midst of their operations thereunder, the said plaintiffs rep-
resented and stated to the defendant that they had fully 
performed and completed the construction work under and 
required by the provisions of defendant's contract with the 
said Jacobson Construction Company, with the result that 
a net profit was earned in the sum of to wit: $5,400. But 
defendant alleges that the work on said job had not been 
completed but the same remained largely incomplete at said 
time, as the plaintiffs well knew or could and should have 
known by reference to the said contract and the specifica-
tions thereof. 
5. That defendant was then busily occupied and en-
grossed with his work upon other large and important con-
tracts and construction jobs requiring his entire time and 
attention. He believed the said statements and representa-
tions of the plaintiffs to be true, reposing trust and confi-
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dence in their honesty, integrity and business capacity. S< 
believing, and intending to compensate them liberally f01 
faithful service well done and profitable to himself, the de. 
fendant thereupon paid to each of the plaintiffs the sum of 
$1,000 as full payment and extra emolument to them there-
for, in the form of a division of the profits believed to have 
been earned by them for him. 
6. That thereafter it was ascertained and determined 
by engineers employed by the military authorities of the 
United States, for whose use and benefit said work was 
ordered by said Jacobson Construction Company, that work 
under said contract was and remained largely incomplete. 
Thereupon claim and demand was made upon defendant by 
said corporation for completion of said unfinished job, and 
the same was thereafter completed by or on behalf of this 
defendant, and at his cost and expense. The cost of such 
completion consumed the entire contract price and more, re-
sulting in a loss to defendant in excess. thereof, and produc-
ing a loss of more than the $2,000 paid to the plaintiffs. By 
due and reasonable care, diligence, skill and ability the said 
job could have been completed at a profit. 
7. That the plaintiffs are men of uncertain finances 
and an action at law would be no adequate remedy. That 
the items of receipts and disbursements to be taken into ac-
count are numerous and complicated; that the reckoning in-
volves matters to be taken into account in equity in matters 
of breach of the relation of trust and confidence, and re-
quires also a measure of discovery from the plaintiffs in 
the matter of their books and records.; that in addition a 
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;eparate computation thereof would involve a multiplicity 
)f actions, whereas the same may be conveniently taken into 
account in the same proceeding with the accounting required 
under the third defense and counter-claim hereof, and at 
less cost and expense than in a separate accounting. 
8. As a further ground therefor, defendant alleges 
that the said Fort Douglas job herein mentioned, is within 
the time and scope of the alleged partnership contract al-
leged by plaintiff in their amended complaint herein as com-
mencing to operate from the forepart of April, 1942. 
WHEREFORE, defendant demands judgment against 
the plaintiffs that they account to defendant for and con-
cerning their transactions under said Fort Douglas job, and 
and that the same be included in any accounting to be or-
dered or decreed as prayed for in the third defense and 
counter-claim hereunder; that a general balance be struck 
and that defendant recover judgment against plaintiffs for 
the amount so to be found due him, and for costs of this 
action. 
(Verified) 
(Filed Feb. 2, 1943) 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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EXHIBIT E 
(Rec. 448-478) 
CASE NO. 69166 
NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY 
REPORT ON ACCOUNTING 
Stearns-Rogers Job 
Fort Douglas Job 
Harrison-Dorman Job 
GeerJob 
Railroad Job 
Hospital Job 
Filed in the Clerk's Office, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 
June 3, 1943. 
Alvin Keddington, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
Filed August 27, 1943. 
By Robert A. Olsen, 
Deputy Clerk. 
Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah. 
THE GODDARD-ABBEY CO. 
Certified Public Accountants 
Mcintyre Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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May 28, 1943 
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, 
Judge Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dear Sir: 
Pursuant to an order of the court dated April 
24, 1943, in the matter entitled E. J. Huber and 
Ralph Dunkley vs. Victor Newman, the undersigned 
has made an examination of existing books, docu-
ments and papers submitted by the parties to this 
suit, and has made considerable independent investi-
gation to establish facts not shown by such records. 
A report is now presented consisting of the exhibits 
and schedules listed 'below, together with comments 
relating thereto. 
EXHIBITS: 
"A" Summary of Income and Expenses by 
Jobs. 
"B" Statement of the Account of Victor New-
man. 
"C" Statement of the Account of Huber and 
Dunkley. 
SCHEDULES: 
"1" Stearns-Rogers Job-Revenue. 
"2" Stearns-Rogers Job-Job Costs. 
"3" Fort Douglas Job-Revenues. 
"4" Fort Douglas Job-Disbursements. 
"5" Fort Douglas J o'b-Equipment Rentals 
Payable. 
"6" Fort Douglas Job-Pay Roll Taxes. 
"7" Wendover Jobs-Revenues. 
"8" Wendover Jobs-Disbursements. 
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"9" Wendover Jobs-Equipment Rentals Dw 
to Victor Lawrence as at September 3 
1942. 
"10" Wendover Jobs-Equipment Rentals Dw 
to Victor Newman as at September 3 
1942. 
"11" Wendover Jobs-Equipment Rentals DuE 
to Ed Huber as at September 3, 1942. 
"12" Wen dover Jobs-Equipment Rentals Due 
to Ralph Dunkley as at September 3, 
1942. 
"13" Wendover Jobs-Bills Due on Wendover 
Jobs as at September 3, 1942 subsequently 
paid by Victor Newman. 
"14" Wendover Jobs-Pay Roll Taxes Payable 
by Victor Newman. 
"15" Wendover Jobs-Pay Roll Taxes Payable 
by Huber and Dunkley and Account Pay-
able by Huber and Dunkley. 
"16" Wendover Jobs-Costs on Railroad Job 
at Salduro during November, 1942. 
"17" Funds transferred to Huber and Dunkley 
by Victor Newman. 
COMMENTS 
Exhibit "A" has been constructed to show the 
amount of net profits resulting from the various jobs 
covered by this report. The detailed items entering 
into the revenues and expenses of the various jobs 
are shown in the schedules numbered "1" to "17" re-
ferred to in Exhibit "A." 
Exhibit "B" is a statement of the account- of 
Victor Newman in which he is given credit for one-
third of the profits accruing from the jobs, together 
with credits for equipment rentals earned by his own 
equipment while working on the jobs in question, and 
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credits for expenditures paid or payable by him on 
account of these jobs for which he should be reim-
bursed from revenues received from the job. The 
account has been charged with all revenues accru-
ing from the jobs in question which have been paid 
to Newman. The excess of charges to Newman's 
account over the credits to which he is entitled rep-
resents an amount for which Newman is accountable 
to Huber and Dunkley. 
Exhibit "C" is a statement of the account of 
Huber and Dunkley in which they are given credit 
for two-thirds of the profits from the jobs in question 
together with credits for equipment rentals due them 
and credits for expenditures made by them. Their 
account is charged with revenues accruing from the 
jobs which were paid to them, and they are also 
charged with funds transferred to them by Newman. 
The resulting excess of credits over charges in their 
a.ccount is the reciprocal to the balance in Newman's 
account and represents the amount due from New-
man. 
While it is recognized there may be expenditures 
related to the jobs in question which are not reflected 
in this report, such omission if it exists, is due to a 
lack of any record or evidence of such expenditure 
coming to the attention of the referee in this matter. 
There are two or three special circumstances 
which the referee feels should be covered by brief 
comment in this report in order to clarify the posi-
tion taken. 
There are certain revenues which have been in-
cluded in Schedule "3" which it may be argued should 
not be included in this report. The items in question 
are the amounts of $147.00 for extra work and $466.00 
received from J. H. Haslem. The reason these amounts 
have been included, is the fact that the costs incurred 
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in connection with these two revenues are includet 
in the costs of the Fort Douglas Job on Newman': 
books and cannot be segregated. 
Due to the fact that costs related to the job1 
at Wendover do not lend themselves to easy segrega 
gation those jobs have been treated as a unit in thil 
report. The final result is not affected in any wal 
by this method of handling and it was felt that thE 
considerable additional time that would be required 
to make a segregation would cause unwarranted ad· 
ditional expense. 
The revenue from the hospital job, as shown in 
schedule "7" has been bas.ed upon the number of 
cubic yards reported to be in place as at the close of 
business September 3, 1942. The report was received 
from Lt. Col. G. A. Howarth, area engineer for the 
U. S. Government at Wend over, upon request by the 
undersigned made through Mr. Newman. In another 
letter from Gol. How.arth advice is given that the 
total yardage of the hospital job, exclusive of mis-
cellaneous work done under that contract number, is 
72,676.05 cubic yards. The hospital job proper is 
reported as officially completed under date of Sep-
tember 30, 1942. Request has been made of Mr. New-
man's office to furnish information from the U.S. 
area engineer, and from their own records, giving 
details as to the placement of the yardage. represented 
by the difference between 59,492 yards and 72,676.05 
yards. Up to the date of the preparation of this re-
port the additional information has not been received. 
There is a difference of opinion between the 
parties involved in this case as to the price per cubic 
yard at which the revenue from the hospital job 
should b~ computed. The original contract called for 
100,000 cubic yards of fill at a price of 59 cents per 
yard. Under date of September 6, 1942, a change 
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order relating to this contract was initiated, and final 
approval was given in December, 1942, changing the 
terms of the contract to 100,000 cubic yards at a 
price of 69 cents. The change order in itself does not 
offer any particular explanation for the change made. 
\Vithout presuming to express any opinion as to the 
legal implications of the change order in question, the 
undersigned has used a price of 69 cents upon the 
assumption the change order relates to the contract 
as a whole. 
R. lVL Birdzell of Wen dover, Utah, has made a 
claim that there is a balance of $2,632.45 owing him 
for sand and gravel, and fill dirt in connection with 
the Harrison and Dorman job. Investigation concern-
ing this claim has developed the fact that a contro-
versy exists v1ith respect to whether or not this 
amount is owing by Newman, Huber and Dunkley. 
Due to the fact the amount has never been paid and 
there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not 
it is due no effect has been given to same in this re-
port. If it develops that such amount, or any portion 
of it, is owing then it should be charged one-third 
to Newman and two-thirds to Huber and Dunkley 
to maintain the proper relationships of the parties 
as set forth in this report. 
The final matter relates to information given by 
Mr. Bradshaw Harrison of the firm of Harrison and 
Dorman. Mr. Harrison stated to the undersigned 
that under date of April 28, 1943, his firm had made 
a demand upon Victor Newman for payment of the 
sum of $7,579.64 in connection with their contract 
with Newman. It was explained that this amount 
represented a settlement with Curtis Sand and Gravel 
Company of the excess cost in having Curtis com-
plete Newman's contract with them. No effect has 
been given to this item in this report and if this 
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amount, or any part of it, is determined to be due 
Harrison and Dorman it should be charged one-third 
to Newman and two-thirds to Huber and Dunkley. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wallace W. Dansie, 
Certified Public Accountant. 
Here follows some twenty-five pages of tabulated figures ar-
ranged in columns, headings, totals, etc. We do not deem 
it necessary or material to print these tables for the rea-
son that our objections do not run to the additions or 
computations, but to the sources from which the informa-
tion was obtained, the privacy of the investigations by 
which it was obtained, and the referee's failure to con-
duct a public judicial trial as a basis for its compilation. 
THE AUTHORS 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rec. 83-90) 
This cause coming on regularly to be heard before the 
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, one of the Judges of the above 
entitled court, sitting without a jury, at the courtroom of 
said court, in the City and County Building at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the 4th day of June, 1943, the plaintiffs, 
E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley, appearing in person and 
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with their attorney, Louis H. Callister, and the defendant, 
Victor Newman, appearing in person and with his attorneys, 
0. H. Matthews and E. M. Morrissey, and evidence being 
submitted by the plaintiffs and defendant, and it further 
appearing that the court was fully advised in the premises, 
now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, to wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on or about the fore part of April, 1942, the 
plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral agreement in 
which they agreed to enter into contracting business to 
accept bids and do work on certain jobs in the intermountain 
area; it was further orally agreed between the parties here-
to, E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley and Victor Newman, that 
on any of the jobs where the plaintiffs or the defendant 
furnished equipment or machinery that they would receive 
a reasonable rental therefor, and the same to be deducted 
as expenses, the same as any other machinery or equipment 
rented from outside parties; said oral agreement further 
provided that any profits from any job were to be paid to 
the plaintiffs and defendant one-third each, that is on~third 
to each of the plaintiffs and one-third to the defendant; that 
pursuant to said oral agreement plaintiffs and defendant 
made bids on jobs, and particularly on jobs herein set forth, 
sometimes in the names of the plaintiff and sometimes in 
the name of the defendant; that the said plaintiffs and the 
defendant did various jobs under the terms and conditions 
of this agreement from the fore part of April, 1942, to and 
including the 3rd day of September, 1942; that on the jobs 
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in which an accounting was had the profits derived there-
from in accordance with said agreement were divided one-
third to each party, that is, one-third each to each of the 
plaintiffs and one-third to the defendant. However, there 
was not a complete accounting on what is termed the Stearns 
Rogers Job, Harrison-Dorman Job, Geer Job, Fort Douglas 
Job, Railroad Job and Hospital Job; that the plaintiffs and 
defendant accepted and did work as a joint venture on the 
aforementioned jobs under the terms and conditions of said 
oral agreement herein above set forth ; this court finds that 
the plaintiffs. and defendant entered into s.aid jobs on a joint 
venture and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to a com-
plete accounting as to all moneys. received and disbursed by 
the said defendant and the plaintiffs in the aforementioned 
jobs. That the court, in order to ascertain all of the facts 
in this case, appointed a referee, that is, Wallace Dansie, to 
make a report of this court as to an accounting as to the 
amounts due and owing from this defendant to these plain-
tiffs. 
2. That the referee has. heretofore rendered to this 
court his report and accounting, of which this court has 
adopted in part and modified in part; that this court finds 
that the plaintiffs and defendants entered into the afore-
mentioned jobs on a joint venture, and in respect to the hos-
pital job that there was a joint venture as of to and includ-
ing the 3rd day of September, 1942. 
3. That these plaintiffs. have at all times and in all 
things duly conformed to their understandings and done 
their part in all respects. in accordance with said understand-
ings. 
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4. That there was no definite term agreed upon be-
tween the parties as to the term of said joint venture; that 
the defendant, Victor Newman, refused to account for 
moneys received and expended in respect to the jobs here-
inabove set forth in paragraph one. 
5. That the court heretofore appointed Wallace Dansie 
as the referee to render an accounting before this court as 
to the amount due and owing between the plaintiffs, E. J. 
Huber and Ralph Dunkley, and the defendant, Victor New-
man; that the referee found, and the court hereby adopts 
the report in which he found, the following due and owing 
in respect to income and disbursements between the parties 
hereto: 
Exhibit "A" 
NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY 
SUMMARY OF INCOME AND EXPENSES BY JOBS 
STEARNS-ROGERS JOB: 
Total Revenue-per Schedule No. 1 ..... $550.20 
Total Expenses-per Schedule No. 2 .... 436.98 
Net profit from Job ............... . $113.22 
FORT DOUGLAS JOB-JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION CO.: 
Total Revenue-per Schedule No.3. $12,110.85 
Expenses: 
Disbursements per 
Schedule No. 4 .... $7,197.76 
Equipment Rentals, 
Schedule No. 5. . . . 1,144.13 
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Pay Roll Taxes, 
Schedule No.6.... 89.20 
Total expenses . . . . . . . . . . . 8,431.09 
Net profit from job . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3,679.76 
WENDOVER JOBS-HARRISON AND DORMAN JOB 
Revenue: 
GEER JOB 
RAILROAD JOB 
HOSPITAL JOB 
Harrison and Dorman Job, per 
schedule "7" ................ $15,997.00 
Geer Job, per schedule "7" . . . . . 1,192.00 
Railroad Job, per schedule "7" . . 2,900.00 
Hospital Job, per schedule "7" .. 41,049.48 
Total 
Expenses: 
Disbursements, per schedule, "8": 
R. Dunkley Account ........... $ 1,653.56 
Huber and Dunkley Account . . . 12,67 4.31 
Victor Newman Account . . . . . . 17,420.52 
Ed. Huber Account . . . . . . . . . . . 865.14 
Accounts Payable: 
Equipment Rentals: 
Due Victor Lawrence, per 
schedule "9" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 718.90 
Due Victor Newman, per 
schedule "10" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,780.23 
$61,138.48 
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Due Ed. Huber, per 
schedule "11" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695.47 
Due Ralph Dunkley, per 
schedule "12" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600.51 
Miscellaneous Bills, per 
schedule "13" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,240.34 
Pay Roll Taxes, per 
schedule "14" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224.80 
Pay Roll Taxes, per 
schedule "15" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448.25 
Due State Line Service, per 
schedule "15" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195.47 
Costs on Railroad Job incurred 
during November, per schedule 
"16" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,150.10 
Total Expenses . . . . . . . . . . 47,667.60 
Net Profit from Wendover Jobs. $13,470.88 
Exhibit "B" 
NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY 
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT OF VICTOR NEWMAN 
CREDITS TO ACCOUNT: 
:Ya of profit on Stearns-Rogers Job-Exhibit 
"A" ................................. $ 
:Ya of profit on Fort Douglas Job-Exhibit 
"A" ................................ . 
:Ya of profit on Wendover Jobs-Exhibit "A". 
Truck rental due on Stearns-Rogers Job-
See schedule "2" ..................... . 
Disbursements on Stearns-Rogers Job--
See schedule "2" ..................... . 
Pay Roll Taxes on Stearns-Rogers Job-
Schedule "2" ......................... . 
37.74 
1,226.59 
4,490.29 
6.00 
369.25 
15.48 
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Disbursements on Fort Douglas Job-
Schedule "4" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,197.76 
Payments to Huber and Dunkley-Schedule 
"4" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000.00 
Equipment rentals due on Fort Douglas Job 
-Schedule "5" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947.25 
Pay Roll Taxes on Fort Douglas Job-
Schedule "5" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89.20 
Disbursements on Wendover Jobs-Schedule 
"8" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,420.52 
Equipment Rentals due Victor Lawrence on 
Wen dover J obs~Schedule "9" . . . . . . . . . . 4, 718.90 
Equipment Rentals due Victor Newman on 
Wendover Jobs-See schedule "10" . . . . . . 5,780.23 
Bills Payable on Wend over Jobs subsequently 
paid by Newman-See schedule "13" . . . . . . . 1,240.34 
Pay Roll Taxes on Wendover Jobs payable by 
Newman-See schedule "14" . . . . . . . . . . . 224.80 
Costs on Railroad Job in Nov. due Newman 
-Schedule "16" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,150.10 
Funds transferred to Huber and Dunkley for 
Wendover Jobs-Schedule "17" ......... 11,756.51 
Total credits ...................... $58,670.96 
CHARGES TO ACCOUNT: 
Receipts from Fort Douglas Job-Jacobsen 
Construction Company ................. $12,110.85 
Receipts from Harrison and Dorman ....... 15,997.00 
Receipts from Railroad Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,900.00 
Revenue from Hospital Job-59,492 cu. yds. 
@ 69c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,049.48 
Total charges ..................... $72,057.33 
Amount Due to Huber and Dunkley-Excess 
of Charges over Credits ................ $13,386.37 
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Exhibit "C" 
NEWMAN, HUBER AND DUNKLEY 
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT OF HUBER AND DUNKLEY 
CREDITS TO ACCOUNTS: 
2;3 of profit on Stearns-Rogers Job-Exhibit 
"A" ................................. $ 
2;3 of profit on Fort Douglas Job-Exhibit 
"A" ................................ . 
2j3 of profit on Wendover Jobs-Exhibit "A". 
Truck rentals due Ralph Dunkley on Stearns-
Rogers Job-Schedule "2" ............. . 
Truck rentals due Ed. Huber on Fort Douglas 
Job-Schedule "5" .................... . 
Truck rentals due Ralph Dunkley on Fort 
Douglas Job-Schedule "5" ............ . 
Disbursements on Wendover Jobs-Schedule 
"8": 
75.48 
2,453.17 
8,980.59 
46.25 
46.25 
150.63 
Ralph Dunkley Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,653.56 
Huber and Dunkley Account . . . . . . . . . . 12,67 4.31 
Ed. Huber Account ................. . 
Truck rentals due Ed. Huber on Wendover 
Jobs-Schedule "11" .................. . 
Truck rentals due Ralph Dunkley on 
Wendover Jobs-Schedule "12" ........ . 
Pay Roll Taxes on Wendover Jobs payable 
by Huber and Dunkley-Schedule "15" ... 
Account with State Line Service paid by 
Huber and Dunkley-Schedule "15" ..... . 
865.14 
695.47 
600.51 
448.25 
195.47 
Total credits ...................... $28,885.08 
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CHARGES TO ACCOUNTS: 
Receipts from Stearns-Rogers Job-
Schedule "1" .......................... $ 550.20 
Payment by Newman to Huber-Schedule 
"17" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000.00 
Payment by Newman to Dunkley --Schedule 
"17" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000.00 
Receipts from Geer Job-Schedule "7" . . . . . 1,192.00 
Funds Transferred to Huber and Dunkley by 
Newman-Schedule "17" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,756.51 
Total charges . ~ ................... $15,498.71 
Amount Due from Victor Newman-Excess 
of Credits over Charges ................ $13,386.37 
6. The court further finds that there was delivered on 
the Wendover Hospital Fill Job 72,676.05 cubic yards. of 
dirt in accordance with the contract between Victor New-
man for and on behalf of the parties1 hereto and the United 
States Government (War Department) ; that there should 
be added to the amount due and owing as found by the ref-
eree of $13,386.37, the sum of two-thirds of the difference 
between 59,492 yards and 72,676.05 yards at a rate of sixty 
nine cents per cubic yard, that is, $6,064.66, making a total 
of $19,451.03; the court finds that the sum of $19,451.03 is 
the amount due and owing from this defendant, Victor New-
man, to these plaintiffs, E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley, as 
a result of the joint venture on the following jobs: Stearns-
Rogers Job, Fort Douglas Job, Harrison-Dorman Job, Geer 
Job, Railroad Job, and Hospital Job. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
147 
7. The court further finds that there has been pre-
sented to the defendant, Victor Newman, claims by certain 
contractors, that is, Harrison-Dorman and R. M. Birdzell, in 
the sums of $7,579.64 and $2,632.45 respectively, making a 
total of $10,212.09; the court further finds that the plain-
tiffs and each of them are entitled to a judgment of this 
court in the sum of $19,451.03. That in view of the alleged 
claims of the Harrison-Dorman and R. M. Birdzell, this court 
finds that these plaintiffs shall have judgment in the sum 
of $12,642.97, being the difference between their propor-
tionate share of the alleged claims, that is, $10,212.09, which 
is $6,808.06, and the amount due as found by this court, that 
is, $19,451.03. Upon presentation to this court of an in-
demnity bond indemnifying the said defendant, Victor New-
man, against all claims, damages, costs and expenses that 
may arise, and any re-negotiations with respect to the jobs 
herein set forth, as a result of the non-payment of said 
claims and defense of said claims not to exceed the sum of 
$7,000.00, which bond must be approved by this court, then 
the plaintiffs, E. J. Huber and Ralph Dunkley, shall be en-
titled to an additional judgment in the sum of $6,808.06, in 
addition to the judgment which this court shall render this 
day in the sum of $12,642.97; that said indemnity bond shall 
provide among other things that the parties, that is, E. J. 
Huber and Ralph Dunkley, shall have the right and option 
to participate in the defense of said alleged claims, and par-
ticipate in any re-negotiations. 
8. That this court requires said indemnity bond upon 
the condition that the said Victor Newman shall also present 
to this court for approval his indemnity bond indemnifying 
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the plaintiffs. and each of them, that is, E. H. Huber and 
Ralph Dunkley, in a sum not to exceed one-third of the 
amount of said claims, that is, $3,300.00, which bond shall 
indemnify the plaintiffs in the same manner in which the 
court finds the plaintiffs should indemnify the defendant, 
Victor Newman, as hereinabove set forth ; that upon refusal 
of the said Victor Newman, to present such a bond within 
five days after an indemnity bond has been approved by this 
court of the plaintiffs. in this action, or such other time as 
the court may deem just and proper in the premises, then 
and in that event, these plaintiffs shall be absolved from 
any require.ment of the indemnity bond, and the plaintiffs' 
bond shall be delivered back to the plaintiffs and they shall 
have the right and opportunity to execute upon this judg-
ment, that is, the whole thereof, the sum of $19,451.03. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court con-
cludes as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiffs. and defendant entered into the 
construction jobs as hereinabove set forth on the basis of 
a joint venture, and are accountable to each other as to 
profits and losses on the basis of one-third each, that is, one-
third to each of the plaintiffs. and one-third to the defendant. 
2. That there is due and owing from this defendant, 
Victor Newman, to these plaintiffs, the sum of $19,451.03, 
as a result of said joint venture, and based upon an account-
ing of moneys received and expended by the parties hereto. 
3. That the plaintiffs, before they may execute upon 
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a portion of this judgment, that is, the difference between 
$12,642.97 and $19,451.03, shall have approved by this court 
an indemnity bond indemnifying the defendant against loss 
or expenses justifiably and reasonably incurred as a result 
of any damages, moneys expended or costs incurred by Har-
rison-Dorman and R. lVL Birdzell as hereinabove set forth 
in said Findings of Fact not to exceed the sum of $7,000.00; 
upon the express condition that the defendant shall within 
five days, or a reasonable time as set by this court, also 
have a bond approved by this court indemnifying these 
plaintiffs in the same manner as these plaintiffs shall in-
demnify the defendant, in a sum not to exceed $3,300.00. 
4. That these plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment in 
the sum of $19,451.03, as due and owing from this defen-
dant, Victor Newman, and that the plaintiffs are entitled 
to execute upon this judgment in the sum of $12,642.97, 
forthwith. 
Done in open court this 7th day of June, 1943, 1:58 P.M. 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
Judge. 
Attest: ALVIN KEDDINGTON, Clerk. 
By: ROBERT A. OLSEN, Deputy Clerk. 
(SEAL) 
Received a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law this 5th day of June, 1943, at the hour of 
10:15 o'clock A.M. 
0. H. MATTHEWS, E. S., 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
Attorney for the Defendant. 
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Received a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Con 
elusions of Law this 5th day of June, 1943, at the hour 01 
11 :10 o'clock A. M. 
EDW. M. MORRISSEY, 
E. M. MORRISSEY, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Per E. LYNCH. 
ENDORSED NUMBER 69166. FILED IN THE CLERK'S 
OFFICE, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, JUNE 7, 1943. 
ALVIN KEDDINGTON, CLERK 3RD DISTRICT COURT, 
BY ROBERT A. OLSEN, DEPUTY CLERK. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
(Rec. 91-92) 
JUDGMENT 
This cause coming on regularly to be heard before the 
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich, one of the Judges of the above 
entitled court, sitting without a jury, at the courtroom of 
said court, in the City and County Building at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the 4th day of June, 1943, the plaintiffs., E. J. 
Huber and Ralph Dunkley, appearing in person and with 
their attorney, Louis H. Callister, and the defendant, Victor 
Newman, appearing in person and with his attorneys, 0. H. 
Matthews and E. M. Morrissey, and evidence being sub· 
mitted by the plaintiffs and defendant, and it further ap-
pearing that the court was fully advised in the premises, and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions. having been entered herein. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That there is due and owing from the defendant, 
Victor Newman, to these plaintiffs, that is, E. J. Huber and 
Ralph Dunkley, the sum of $19,451.03. 
2. That the plaintiffs shall not have execution upon 
this judgment for the sum of $6,808.06 until such time as 
they shall submit to this court an indemnity bond indemnify-
ing the defendant against payment of certain claims known 
as the Harrison-Dorman and R. M. Birdzell, and re-negotia-
tions of contracts, said indemnity bond to be approved by 
this court, not to exceed $7,000.00; upon condition, how-
ever, that defendant give to these plaintiffs the same type 
of indemnity bond within five days, or such time as the 
court may deem just and proper in the premises. Upon aP-
proval of said bonds the plaintiffs shall have execution for 
the difference between the said $12,642.97 and $19,451.03, 
that is $6,808.06, or upon the refusal of the defendant to 
post a bond as herein provided. 
Done in open court this 7th day of June, 1943. 1:58 P.M. 
Filed June 7, 1943. 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
Judge. 
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